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INTRODUCTION
PARTNER: I can tell you there are a lot of folks at my age and
stage who are tired, tired of feeling this way. Folks like me who
have gone out of our way to the tune of hundreds of hours a year
every year to do firm-related stuff, for which we know there is no
compensation. You know, being a team player you want the team
to take care of you, but over time you start to feel like a chump.
INTERVIEWER: I take it that your concern is not simply what
the compensation reflects in a material sense . . . ?
PARTNER: It’s about respect.
INTERVIEWER: It’s about respect.
PARTNER: Of course. What isn’t?1
In this article, we discuss the complex significance of the partner com-
pensation process in large law firms. Our research suggests that this process
allocates both material and symbolic goods within firms. The criteria that a
firm uses to determine compensation do not simply result in differences in
the financial rewards that partners receive. They also can signal to a partner
the extent to which he or she is respected as a valuable member of the firm.
Seen in this way, the compensation process is an important occasion for a
firm to consider how to fashion an understanding of what it means to be a
lawyer. This understanding must accommodate both increasing business
pressures and traditional notions of professionalism. How a firm responds
to this challenge can have a profound effect on its culture, as well as on its
chance of surviving in an era in which law firms can dissolve with breath-
taking speed.
Our observations are based on an ongoing empirical research project
on law firm culture, which thus far has involved 116 interviews with law-
yers in fourteen firms. All but 11 of these interviews have been with part-
ners. All but three of these firms are in the American Lawyer list of the 100
firms with the highest revenues. Interviewees were selected solely by the
researchers, who attempted to include subjects who provided a reasonable
representation of lawyers based on partnership tier, practice area, seniority,
age, gender, ethnic background, office location, experience at other firms,
and management experience. All interviews were done in person, and
ranged from one to two-and-a-half hours each. All interviewees were as-
sured of anonymity.
At first blush, the significance of the compensation process may seem
obvious: it represents an economy in which the firm distributes material
rewards to its partners. From this perspective, disputes and dissatisfaction
regarding compensation are simply attempts by partners to improve their
financial well-being in the firm’s material economy. Our research suggests,
however, that compensation serves to distribute not just money, but also
1. Interview 98 at 6 (July 23, 2012).
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respect. The dynamics of partner compensation in a firm serve to both es-
tablish and express criteria of value—to define what it means to be a good
lawyer in that firm. The relative weight of these criteria has been changing
in most firms over the past three decades or so. This means that law firm
compensation processes, which serve as the bases for conveying respect for
partners have been changing as well.
Greater competitive pressures have led firms to place more emphasis
on business skills and less on traditional professional competencies and
qualities. Such skills involve the sales and business development acumen
necessary to bring in clients to the firm, which results in the originating
attorney collecting a high percentage of the fees that clients are charged.
Because law firms have always been businesses, certain lawyers known as
“rainmakers” have always possessed and been rewarded for such skills. The
market conditions in which firms operated until the last few decades none-
theless allowed firms to treat these skills as but one of several factors rele-
vant to compensation. Increasingly intense competition for business in
recent years, however, has made business skills more important than per-
haps ever before for lawyers and law firms.
The business skills that are valuable in today’s law firms represent
qualities different from most of those traditionally used to evaluate whether
someone is a good lawyer, such as the quality of work as judged by internal
professional standards, the provision of conscientious service to clients re-
gardless of its profitability, a spirit of collegiality, devotion of time to serv-
ing as a mentor to junior lawyers, and the devotion of some portion of time
to serving the community and the public good. The difference between the
two sets of skills is not stark: a successful rainmaker must of course have
good legal skills and provide valuable service to clients. Increasingly, how-
ever, these qualities are regarded as necessary but not sufficient to warrant
high compensation. It is business skills that now tend to differentiate part-
ners in terms of the financial rewards that they receive.
There is, however, an explanation for this shifting compensation
scheme that reflects a sharper differentiation between business and profes-
sional skills. Many of the traditional professional skills can contribute to the
financial success of a firm, but it can be difficult to isolate and measure
their individual impact. Firms generally did not regard such difficulty as
troublesome when competitive pressures were relatively mild. Because the
firms regarded their financial performance as the product of a common ef-
fort to which each partner contributed in various ways, most firms’ com-
pensation systems did not feature highly differentiated criteria for
measuring individual productivity. The acknowledgment of traditional pro-
fessional skills under previously common compensation schemes under-
scores that distinguishing between law practice as a business and as a
profession can oversimplify the actual experience of lawyers.
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At the same time, these traditional qualities have also been regarded as
intrinsically valuable as the basis for distinguishing law practice from ordi-
nary business organizations, and as establishing standards in a distinct “or-
der of worth.”2 From this perspective, the value of traditional legal skills is
based on standards internal to the profession.3 Apart from their economic
value, these standards provide a basis for respect as a lawyer. They also
provide sources of professional satisfaction, apart from financial reward,
that enhance the attractiveness of those firms that make an effort to nurture
them. Firms that can provide such satisfaction have the potential to create
stronger forms of organizational glue than those firms that focus simply on
financial performance.
The challenge for the modern law firm is to create these forms of orga-
nizational glue while keeping content the rainmakers who generate the most
revenues. A firm risks collapse if its high-revenue producers become dissat-
isfied and leave with clients. As David Jargiello and Phyllis Gardner de-
scribe it, “large firms unravel in an almost formulaic manner. Generally
speaking, the downward spiral is triggered when a number of partners with
material portable business—‘revenue-controlling partners’—become disaf-
fected with leadership, and conclude that their own interests are no longer
coincident with the direction of the law firm.”4 What then occurs is
predictable:
The spiral begins in earnest when the disaffected revenue-control-
ling partners leave the law firm for what they perceive to be a
better managed, better run, and therefore superior platform. De-
fection, in turn, creates financial distress that manifests immedi-
ately. The departing partners (1) strip out their capital
(immediately or through a balance sheet adjustment), (2) take
with them as many of their paying client accounts as possible, (3)
render their outstanding receivables less collectible, and (4) leave
behind overhead in the form of vacant offices, and unnecessary
associates and staff . . . . More revenue controlling partners will
question leadership, and more will defect, resulting in still more
financial stress and fear. If not contained, the foregoing cycle re-
peats like a closed feedback loop with no ‘off’ switch until the
financial stress overwhelms the business and forces closure.5
2. See generally DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECO-
NOMIC LIFE 11–12 (2009) (illustrating the concept of orders of worth by delineating “six discrete
orders of worth” within academia). For a discussion of this concept, see infra text accompanying
notes 212–216.
3. See generally ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984) (developing the concept of
“internal goods” within professions).
4. DAVID JARGIELLO & PHYLLIS GARDNER, FREE AGENT DYSFUNCTION: MANAGEMENT RE-
ALPOLITIK FOR U.S. LAW FIRMS 10 (2010), available at http://www.jargiellolaw.com/White_Paper
_Series_-_Free_Agent_Dysfunction_-_Print_v3.2_-_COPY.pdf.
5. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 5 14-NOV-13 12:16
78 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1
Jargiello and Gardner conclude, “Thus, in the final analysis, it is our
view that a large firm’s death spiral is triggered in the first instance by a
loss of confidence among revenue-controlling partners in the future of the
firm to succeed vis-a`-vis themselves.”6
Most law firms, therefore, believe that they have little choice but to
maximize profits per partner (PPP) and to ensure that rainmakers are hand-
somely rewarded. They regard PPP as crucial in both keeping their
rainmakers from defecting to other firms and convincing rainmakers at
other firms to join them. Increasingly, however, maintaining a high PPP is
seen as necessary but not sufficient to ensure the firm’s survival. Firms
believe that it also is necessary to compensate rainmakers well above the
average that PPP represents. This trend has tended to increase the difference
in compensation between rainmakers and other partners in the firm. Our
research suggests that this can create concern on the part of lower-paid part-
ners not just that they are making less than their higher-paid colleagues, but
also that the firm respects them less than partners who have the business
skills to develop client relationships. Law firms, therefore, face the chal-
lenge in their compensation systems of eliciting the ongoing commitment of
their partners by affording them respect on the basis of what may be very
different criteria. How a firm responds to this challenge will have the effect
of forging a particular conception of professionalism for that organization
and its lawyers.
Section I of this paper describes the significance of compensation sys-
tems in shaping law firm culture, and the particular challenges that firms
face in making compensation decisions. Section II describes the material
economy of compensation, in which compensation represents the distribu-
tion of financial reward among partners. That economy includes two types
of markets. The first is a regulated market in which the firm relies on spe-
cific factors in making compensation decisions.  The second is a largely
unregulated market that features negotiation among partners for origination
credits. Section III describes the moral economy of compensation, which
reflects the role of compensation systems in allocating respect among part-
ners. These systems can affect the extent to which partners feel respected by
both the substance of compensation decisions and the ways in which they
are made. As the section discusses, both the regulated and unregulated mar-
kets of the moral economy present challenges for firms that seek to convey
respect and foster a sense of connection to the firm among their partners.
We approached our research as an exercise in the development of
grounded theory, in an effort “to understand the process by which actors
construct meaning out of intersubjective experience.”7 Our observations
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Roy Suddaby, What Grounded Theory is Not, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 633, 634 (2006). See
generally CHRISTINA GOULDING, GROUNDED THEORY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT,
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therefore reflect not the application of a pre-existing conceptual framework,
but instead the identification of patterns that emerged from analysis of com-
pensation systems and discussions with lawyers about the compensation
process. Section IV suggests, however, that our focus on the compensation
process as an occasion for clarifying and contesting criteria of professional
respect may make archetype theory one especially useful lens through
which to analyze our findings.8
Archetype theory emphasizes that organizational features like struc-
tures and systems are not autonomous and objective. They cannot be added
and subtracted at will in the professional organization. Rather, they embody
interpretive schemes that infuse them with meaning and value as concrete
expressions of what it means to be a professional at a given historical mo-
ment. Scholars call this combination of features and interpretive schemes an
archetype. As our discussion below elaborates in more detail, we can see
the compensation process to some extent as the occasion for contests be-
tween competing archetypes. At issue in these contests is not only the allo-
cation of material goods, but also which interpretive scheme will be used to
make sense of the structural features that law firms are adopting in response
to increasingly intense competitive pressures. From this perspective, negoti-
ation over compensation involves the question of how a firm should balance
its identity both as a major business enterprise and an organization of pro-
fessionals—and what it means to be the latter in an era of tumultuous
change.  Finally, the Conclusion offers some closing thoughts on compen-
sation as an issue that presents, in especially stark form, modern law firms’
attempts to reconcile business demands with traditional professional values.
I. COMPENSATION AND CULTURE
Compensation is a pervasive theme when lawyers discuss their firm’s
culture. Time and again, we hear that a firm’s compensation system plays a
crucial role in shaping its culture, and that partner satisfaction with compen-
sation is critical in eliciting attachment to the firm. One partner describes
the significance of compensation this way:
At the end of the day, after all of these things, the barometer is
compensation, okay? Compensation sends incentives, it sends sig-
nals, it conveys culture. This is the language that we speak, it’s
the way we know how we’re valued. [W]e know everything by
how we are compensated, by whatever the metrics are for
compensation.9
BUSINESS AND MARKET RESEARCHERS (2002) (offering a detailed explanation of grounded theory
methodology and contextualizing the theory within the research process).
8. See infra at 83–101.
9. Interview 79 at 2 (Apr. 17, 2012).
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Similarly, when asked what is most important in differentiating law
firm cultures from one another, another partner responds, “I would say that
one of the big things is their compensation system. . . . That is one of the
things that I would look at— . . . not so much . . . the executive committee,
the management committee, but the comp[ensation] committee. [H]ow does
the comp[ensation] committee work?”10
Lawyers note that compensation shapes culture through the behaviors
that it encourages and discourages. If a firm pronounces the importance of
pro bono work but seems not to take it into account in setting compensa-
tion, it will be clear to lawyers that the firm does not regard time spent on
pro bono matters as important. Similarly, if a firm provides compensation
credit for a partner who takes on non-billable management responsibilities
when he could be devoting that time to developing his own clients, the firm
credibly signals that it values partners who are willing to make some per-
sonal sacrifices on behalf of the firm as a whole.
When asked what are indications of the culture of a potential law firm
merger partner, one partner emphasizes, “Well one of the things for exam-
ple is . . . how do you do compensation and how are you rewarding people
because that tells you a lot right there. What are your views on pro bono
and community service? Those are the questions you really ask. To what
extent do you work on cross-selling and, you know, team approaches and
those kinds of things.”11
Compensation also is a major subject of discussion in law firms be-
cause keeping partners satisfied with their compensation is crucial in order
to avoid losing highly profitable partners to overtures from other firms in
the lateral market. Virtually every firm’s PPP figure is available in the legal
press.12 This gives partners at least a general idea of how much they might
be able to make elsewhere. While partners making less than the market rate
may stay at a firm for a while out of a sense of loyalty, if the gap becomes
too large they are likely to go. As one partner observes:
[S]ome partners who generate a lot of the income here don’t make
what they could in the marketplace, and a lot of them stay in part
because they love the culture, they love the environment, but at a
certain point the amount of delta between what they make here
and what they could make elsewhere is just too large for them to
stay.13
A partner at another firm underscores this point:
10. Interview 16 at 23 (Nov. 17, 2011).
11. Interview 111 at 13 (Sept. 21, 2012).
12. See, e.g., The 2012 Am Law 200, AM. LAW., May 30, 2012, http://www.americanlawyer.
com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202494427064&The_2012_Am_Law_200 (ranking the top 200
firms according to profit per partner as well as the change in profit per partner from 2010).
13. Interview 12 at 13 (Aug. 18, 2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 8 14-NOV-13 12:16
2012] MONEY AND MEANING 81
[I]f you don’t grow, you die, and you need to grow to stay com-
petitive in compensation because no matter how great your cul-
ture is—we see plenty of firms around with great cultures and
people who love working there, but the firm disintegrates and the
economic forces can do that. At some point people say, “Yeah, I
like this great firm, but if I can make twice as much money by
moving across the street to a firm that seems to have a great fu-
ture, I’ll go.”14
Keeping partners satisfied is an especially difficult task when informa-
tion about each partner’s compensation is shared with all partners in most
firms. This creates the perpetual risk that some people will be dissatisfied.
We know that a person’s satisfaction with his financial condition is based
not on the amount of money that he has, but on how much he has compared
to other people he regards as peers.15 Firms therefore spend a considerable
amount of time and energy in determining partner compensation so that
partners regard the decisions as fair and legitimate. One partner on the com-
pensation committee of his firm describes the process:
We spent a lot of time on compensation. We do partner compen-
sation every year . . . and that takes a lot of time. It’s three days of
meetings just as a committee plus all the meetings with individual
partners . . . . There is an initial meeting with each partner just to
say, “Well, tell us whatever you want to tell us,” and everyone
does a little report about their own performance, and then there is
a follow-up meeting where we say here is what we are going to
recommend that you go up, you go down, you stay the same.16
This partner continues:
I’m on the committee, so I may be a little biased in my views, but
I think it’s a very transparent process. Everybody knows what
every other partner makes. Everybody gets sort of a week or two
weeks to comment on either their own or other people’s compen-
sation before it’s finalized . . . . [E]verybody knows what you are
making and everybody has a chance to be heard, which I think all
[provides] due process . . . .17
The firm also pays a lot of attention to the composition of the
committee:
[T]he compensation committee is in part . . . management but
it’s . . . voted on, . . . so it’s not as if it’s purely [a] management
decision. And so to me it’s actually pretty transparent; it’s got
representatives of all the departments plus these sort of at-large
14. Interview 52 at 14 (July 12, 2011).
15. See Chao C. Chen, Jaepil Choi & Shu-Cheng Chi, Making Justice Sense of Local-Expa-
triate Compensation Disparity: Mitigation by Local Referents, Ideological Explanations, and In-
terpersonal Sensitivity in China-Foreign Joint Ventures, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 807, 808 (2002).
16. Interview 48 at 16–17 (July 11, 2011).
17. Id.
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people, so I feel like all the different interests are represented on
the committee and the committee I think has pretty good
information.18
Both the amount of compensation and the way that it is determined can
shape organizational culture in important ways. In particular, it can affect
the extent to which a partner regards himself mainly as a relatively self-
sufficient free agent or as a member of a larger interdependent community
within the firm. As one partner suggests:
[I]f [the compensation system] is eat what you kill and you’re
paid for working for your client in your own silo, then it’s much
easier for you to pull up and leave. You don’t have those sort of
roots that are expanding out of your own insular group because
you don’t depend on anybody else for your own revenues and
therefore your own compensation, and you are not dependent on
anybody in terms of helping you bring in the dollars.19
There is reason to believe that compensation’s prominence as a subject
of attention in the modern law firm is a phenomenon that has arisen over
the last generation or so of law practice. During this period in which com-
petition for legal services has significantly intensified, compensation has
assumed increasing importance as an instrument in the service of a firm’s
business strategy.
By contrast, a generation ago, when market pressures were less fierce,
a firm could make decisions about compensation based largely on its part-
ners’ decisions about the kinds of satisfaction they wanted from law prac-
tice. These values might include financial reward, collegiality, professional
recognition, intellectual stimulation, service to the community, generosity
toward colleagues, mentoring junior lawyers, and other forms of fulfill-
ment. A firm’s compensation policy arguably reflected the firm’s choice of
how to balance these values. The fact that compensation was rarely a source
of conflict, or even the subject of much explicit attention, within law firms
was ostensibly an indication that non-financial professional values and fi-
nancial rewards were both important to a firm.20 Compensation policy was
thus only one example of the ways in which the classical partnership repre-
sented a “third logic” that featured professional control over the provision
of legal services, as opposed to reliance on the market or bureaucratic
management.21
18. Id. at 17.
19. Interview 16, supra note 10, at 23.
20. See generally SOL LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 29 (1994) (“The compensation schedule in the old-fashioned law firm
was essentially that of the Japanese civil service: Your share was a function of your seniority. . . .
This helped keep partnerships together, because partners were not competing against each
other. . . .”).
21. See generally ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001) (presenting
professional formation as a more viable alternative to consumerism and bureaucracy).
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Viewed against this background, the evolution of compensation might
seem an instance of the ways in which business considerations have come
to dominate professional values in modern law practice. One might think
that for all that a law firm may talk of other values, the only value that
really matters is money: generating enough profit to keep partners happy.
For all that a partner may talk of the importance of professionalism, the
only thing that motivates him and keeps him at his firm is compensation—
the more the better.
Assuming that the meaning of compensation is limited to financial
considerations, however, misses its full significance within a law firm.
When lawyers talk about compensation, they tend to refer to sources and
criteria of value other than money, which have the potential to provide
meaning in their lives as lawyers. Indeed, it is striking how many lawyers in
our study refer to the amount of their compensation as far more than they
could reasonably expect or deserve to make. One lawyer, for instance, says,
“I mean I talked to my kids and my wife about it . . . . [I]t is a ridiculous
amount of money. I almost feel guilty about it and I’m not kidding you.”22
Another muses, “When I looked outside of the window I wonder why in the
world I’m being compensated anywhere near what I’m being compensated
when there are other people who are very talented and very educated that
aren’t earning nearly as much.”23 Another partner says, “I’m always
shocked when I hear that somebody thinks that they should be making more
money than what we are already paid . . . . We are all overpaid.”24
Even allowing for a certain amount of self-serving modesty, these
spontaneous comments suggest that any preoccupation with compensation
is not animated simply by the pursuit of financial gain. Rather, it reflects the
fact that compensation is simultaneously a part of two different economies
in the modern law firm. The material economy of compensation allocates
financial rewards based on business criteria, while the moral economy of
compensation allocates non-financial goods such as respect and meaning
that can serve to provide professional satisfaction. The implicit criteria by
which the firm distributes the latter can have profound significance for the
culture of the firm.
II. THE MATERIAL ECONOMY OF COMPENSATION
A. Partnership Structure
Understanding the material economy of compensation requires appre-
ciation of how competitive pressures on law firms in recent years have
changed career opportunities and the meaning of partnership. The “modern”
large law firm first emerged around the turn of the twentieth century with
22. Interview 79, supra note 9, at 9.
23. Interview 72 at 17 (Aug. 9, 2012).
24. Interview 53 at 13 (July 12, 2011).
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the “Cravath system,” in which young lawyers were hired, trained, and
could eventually be promoted to equity partnership.25 Equity partners are
the working owners of law firms and have a voice in the governance of the
firm as well as a share in the financial profits. Upon entering the equity
partner ranks, a new partner must also contribute capital, for which the firm
typically makes financing available. A new partner is therefore financially
tied to the firm to some extent, and to the rise and fall of the firm’s fortunes.
Promotion criteria for partnership have traditionally included produc-
tion of high-quality work, ability to relate to clients, and perhaps some ca-
pability to attract business.26 Due to the long-term nature of client
relationships in the first part of the twentieth century,27 business generation
ability was less important. However, as the relationships between law firms
and clients became more attenuated and short-term, the market became
more competitive and the role of business generation began to loom larger
in law firm partnerships.28
More intense competition in the legal marketplace has led large U.S.
firms to increasingly require a “business case” to justify elevation to equity
partner, which includes an assessment of a prospective partner’s ability to
bring clients to the firm. As Galanter and Palay wrote of the period starting
around the 1980s, “There is more differentiation in the power and rewards
of partners; standing within the firm depends increasingly on how much
business a partner brings in.”29 These distinctions came into even sharper
relief after the 2008 economic crisis, which has led to a prolonged period of
stagnation in demand for legal services.30 With growth prospects curtailed,
law firms began to value business generation even more in the promotion
and compensation of equity partners.
Partners interviewed for this study reflect a similar observation. Ac-
cording to one respondent, “[w]hen I made partner it was easier, right, it
was work hard, be a good lawyer and you’ll probably make partner.  Now
it’s more of a business case.  Is this person going to be a good generator?”31
Although the traditional Cravath model was an “up or out” model
under which lawyers who were not promoted to partnership were asked to
25. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 9–10 (1991).
26. Id. at 30.
27. See generally ELLEN JOAN POLLOCK, TURKS AND BRAHMINS (1990) (describing the
changing relationships with clients in the case of Chase Manhattan Bank and Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy).
28. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL
STREET LAWYER 15–49 (2004) (describing the transformation from a “Nobody Starves” model to
an “Eat What You Kill” model of law practice).
29. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 25, at 52 (footnote omitted).
30. See, e.g., 2012 Client Advisory, HILDEBRANDT INSTITUTE & CITI PRIVATE BANK (2012),
https://peermonitor.thomsonreuters.com/ThomsonPeer/docs/2012_Client_Advisory.pdf (chroni-
cling the change in fortunes for large law firms in the U.S.; this publication has been issued
annually since the Great Recession began in 2008).
31. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 6.
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leave the firm, this traditional system eventually came under stress. When
law firm profitability stumbled in the 1990s, law firms started to look for
new ways to increase profitability, which led to growth in what are called
income or nonequity partners.32 These partners are not entitled to a share of
the firm’s profits, but are paid a salary and are eligible for annual bonuses.
They are sometimes given voting rights, but the distinction between none-
quity and equity partners is primarily that the majority of the nonequity
partner salary is fixed, rather than variable with the firm’s profitability. The
introduction of this tier of partners enables firms to elevate associates to
partner-level positions without diluting the value of equity partners’ shares
in the firm. Some of these income partners may eventually rise to equity
partner status, but many may not.
A tier of nonequity partners is attractive to firms because it can lessen
the risk of making poor promotion decisions. This can be particularly im-
portant when the firm is facing economic uncertainty. According to one
partner:
[W]e’re oftentimes sitting there with two people [of] seemingly
equal quality and we’re guessing who is going to be the business
generator ten years down the road.  Why not make them both in-
come partners so that they can have the title to the outside world
as partner and let’s see? And you may be surprised. I mean there
are people who blossom much to your surprise, [and] there are
people you think they’ve got everything going for them but some-
how they are not able to generate business.33
  Designation as income partner therefore reflects an intermediate status
between associate and equity partner. In some firms, an income partner has
a certain number of years to develop enough relationships with clients, in
order to establish a business case for his promotion. If he does not establish
such a case, he may be asked to leave the firm. In other firms, an income
partner may remain in the position indefinitely even if he does not generate
his own clients, especially if he has a specialty that is valuable to the firm.
In addition, some firms populate the income partnership tier with both up-
and-coming future equity partners and older senior partners who have been
moved down (sometimes voluntarily but sometimes not) from equity status.
This means that the population of income partners in these firms can be
quite diverse.34
Many up-and-coming income partners are theoretically eligible for
promotion to equity partner within a certain period of time. However, Fig-
32. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transfor-
mation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (2008).
33. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 6.
34. See JOSEPH B. ALTONJI, WHO BROKE THE TWO-TIER MODEL? (2009) (explaining that law
firms’ two-tier model no longer works because equity partners are far less productive than other
lawyers in a typical firm).
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ure 1 shows that nonequity partner ranks have increased in recent years
(approximately 7% Compound Annual Growth Rate “CAGR”) while equity
partnership numbers have remained relatively flat (approximately 1.2%
CAGR). Entrance into the coveted equity ranks has thus become more and
more difficult—the probationary period has become longer and the pros-
pects for promotion have become dimmer.
-
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FIGURE 1: GROWTH IN EQUITY AND NONEQUITY PARTNERSHIP RANKS IN
AMLAW 200 FIRMS 2005–2011
One driver of the growth in nonequity ranks is the tremendous pressure
that large law firms face to increase their profits per equity partner (PPP),
which is published annually in American Lawyer magazine for the largest
200 firms in the United States.35 Absent other data on financial perform-
ance, a firm’s PPP has become a barometer of the firm’s financial health
and its attractiveness as a possible destination for profitable partners at
other firms. Figure 2 shows how PPP growth in AmLaw 200 firms has
surpassed revenue per lawyer (RPL) increases even in the years following
the 2008 economic crisis (4.07% vs. 1.97% CAGR). These data suggest the
importance of maximizing PPP, even in times of economic downturn.
Not only does the drive to continually increase PPP year after year
motivate firms to keep their equity partnership small, but the amount of
revenues that an income partner must generate in order to warrant giving
him a claim on the firm’s profits has also been increasing. As one partner
observes:
35. See The Am Law 100: Firms Ranked by Profits Per Partner, AM. LAW. (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202549384381 (charting the top firms
according to profit per partner).
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FIGURE 2: AVERAGE PROFITS PER EQUITY PARTNER AND REVENUE PER
LAWYER FOR AMLAW 200 FIRMS, 2006–2011
[I]n the pressure world of keeping numbers up . . . so that the
market thinks the firm is doing well, the firm can only make so
many equity partners every year—whereas before they used to
make them just because you were here three years [and] you did a
great job as an income partner . . . .
. . . .
. . . [I]t’s more than ever a function of room within the equity
ranks and the firm taking a hard line on not wanting to issue more
shares, trying to keep the per share value high to keep the people
who are here . . . . And then they want obviously to have a share
value that is high to attract people from the lateral market.36
Increased partner mobility has also served to reduce the rate of promo-
tion to equity partner. Firms tend increasingly to look to laterals from other
firms with large books of business to fill their equity partner ranks.37 This
development means fewer equity partner promotion opportunities from
within the firm. As one partner remarks, “There [are] probably on an annual
basis more equity laterals brought in than equity promotions from within.
That sends a signal to your income partners that makes them wonder,
‘[W]ell how am I ever going to get paid, I guess I’ve got to go somewhere
else.’”38
One income partner laments:
36. Interview 103 at 8, 15 (Aug. 3, 2012).
37. See 2012 Client Advisory, supra note 30, at 14.
38. Interview 103, supra note 36, at 17.
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I think for a lot of us who are in the income partner bracket, we’re
just not sure how we can make equity unless we have . . . access
to a client who will bring in at least a couple million dollars a
year. You know, if [I had] a best friend who is a general counsel
of a multi-million dollar company or something like that . . . I
would have brought that in already. That’s the case for a lot of
people. So given the contracting demand for legal services out
there and . . . the situation internally where it’s very difficult to
make equity, I think there are . . . a lot of people saying, “How am
I going to get there? It’s just impossible to get there because you
can’t make equity by working hard.” That’s just not in the cards
anymore, whereas it used to be.39
On rare occasions, an income partner may be able to make a business
case for promotion based on her management of several important matters
for a client, even if she did not bring the client to the firm. As one income
partner explains:
I would bet you that there will be people this year who make
equity who manage work for a huge client, and at some point in
time you manage so much work the firm gets scared you’re going
to leave and take it somewhere else because you’ve been doing it
long enough, and the matters are important. You don’t get credit
for generating the business, [but] you are managing ten projects
and [thirty] associates and if you went somewhere else the client
will likely go with you.40
Some associates or income partners may also be promoted to equity
partner because they provide important services for clients that other part-
ners bring to the firm. A tax lawyer, for instance, can be integral to business
transactions in which a corporate partner’s clients are involved. A regula-
tory lawyer can be a valuable resource for that same partner’s clients who
operate in a heavily regulated industry. Lawyers such as these may not have
an opportunity to develop ongoing close relationships with major clients.
The business case for their promotion is that they have specialized expertise
that the firm’s important clients need on an ongoing basis. However, even if
they become equity partners, they may be paid more like an income partner.
They are entitled to a share of the firm’s profits, but that amount may be
substantially less than the amount that rainmakers receive.
Finally, the powerful impact of PPP on promotion is reflected in the
increasing willingness of firms to “de-equitize” equity partners whose prof-
itability lags behind that of their colleagues.41 A partner who has been de-
39. Interview 101 at 6 (Aug. 1, 2012).
40. Interview 103, supra note 36, at 10.
41. See generally Robin Sparkman, Am Law 100’s Partner Profits Jumped 8.4% Last Year,
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Apr. 29, 2011, available at http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArti
cleCC.jsp?id=1202492157472&Am_Law_100s_Partner_Profits_Jumped_84_Last_Year (outlin-
ing key statistics based upon the Am Law 100’s rankings).
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equitized is no longer entitled to a share of the firm’s profits, but instead
receives a fixed salary with the opportunity to earn a bonus each year. The
threat of de-equitization creates pressure on the equity partners to continue
to be economically valuable to the firm year after year.
B. Partner Compensation
One of the classic categorizations of attorneys in law firms is by Find-
ers, Minders, and Grinders. Finders are those lawyers who find, or bring in,
new clients, Minders are those who mind, or manage, matters for col-
leagues’ clients, and Grinders are those who toil away at the analytical work
required to provide services from the firm. While these categories typically
classify all lawyers in a firm, from associates (the Grinders) to senior part-
ners (the Finders), the partnership can also be classified into roughly the
same three categories.
Rather than viewing these distinctions as discrete categories, one
might think of them as a spectrum on which one can locate any particular
partner. At the Finder end of the spectrum are those partners who spend
virtually all their time developing new and existing client relationships and
little if any on legal work. Further down the spectrum are Finders who both
bring clients to the firm but also do more work on matters for those clients.
The next location on the spectrum is partners who are a combination of
Finders and Minders. They bring clients to the firm, do some work for
them, but also assume some responsibility for managing matters for other
partners’ clients based on referrals from their colleagues. A pure Minder
may work only on managing matters for colleagues’ clients. Next, some
partners are a combination of Minders and Grinders. Their work for others’
clients consists of some management responsibility and some contribution
of more specialized expertise. Finally, pure Grinders play supporting roles
by solely providing technical assistance, such as analyzing the tax treatment
of a transaction.
The closer a partner is to the Finder end of the spectrum, the more one
can characterize him as a “rainmaker.” The closer a partner is to a pure
Grinder, the more one can think of him as a “service” partner who does
work for other partners’ clients. This classification is increasingly relevant
to law firm compensation decisions.
1. The Building Blocks of Compensation
Compensation for equity partners is largely determined by the percent-
age of the profit pool that is allocated to each partner. The profit pool is
comprised of units or shares allocated across the equity partnership. Unlike
a corporation, where the number of equity shares remains relatively steady
over time, the number of units in a partnership pool is periodically reset—
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often on an annual or biennial basis—based on the number and perform-
ance of equity partners.
Among larger law firms, there are three principal methods for allocat-
ing units to the equity partnership: lockstep, formula, and subjective. Lock-
step firms allocate units according to seniority. The lockstep approach is
rare today in the United States and Canada but is still found with some
frequency in the U.K. and Europe.42 While pure lockstep approaches are
becoming less and less common, a majority of U.K. and European firms
employ some element of lockstep in their compensation systems (known as
modified lockstep), meaning that compensation decisions are based at least
somewhat on seniority.43
Formula-based systems derive partner profit allocations based on a cal-
culation of partners’ financial contributions. These contributions may be
measured by figures such as revenues that a partner brings to the firm (from
new client relationships, new matters for existing clients, hours billed—
regardless of whether the partner originated the matter—and matters re-
ferred to other partners in the firm); realization, or the percentage of fees
that a partner’s client is billed that are actually collected; and other metrics.
Strict formula systems are rare among larger U.S. law firms.44
Finally, subjective compensation or a combination approach incorpo-
rates judgment into the compensation process. Some firms use a formula as
a base for compensation, which is then modified by taking subjective fac-
tors into account (the “combination” system). Other firms employ a purely
subjective approach. The benefit of approaches that incorporate subjectivity
is that they provide the flexibility to change compensation determinations
according to the business needs of the firm. The majority of U.S. firms
employ these types of systems, with approximately 54 percent utilizing a
purely subjective approach and 38 percent opting to pursue the combination
approach. Because systems that incorporate subjectivity are the most com-
monly used in the United States, as well as the most complex, we focus
here for the most part on this type of approach.
Firms employing a subjective or combination system take a number of
factors into account when determining the allocation of units. These factors
may not be explicitly publicized throughout the firm, but even if they are,
there is no specific weight assigned to any one factor (if they did, the sys-
tem would quickly become a formula). Common factors used in determin-
ing compensation include origination, personal production, and
management credit. The relative importance of these factors may change as
a partner moves through the equity ranks, with more junior partners some-
42. See Ed Wesemann & Nick Jarrett-Kerr, 2012 Global Partner Compensation System Sur-
vey, EDGE INTERNATIONAL, 2 (2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-2012-edge-interna
tional-global-partn-82238/.
43. Id. at 4.
44. See id. at 5.
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times having fewer origination pressures, for example, than those who are
more senior.
Origination. One key factor in determining compensation in most law
firms is origination, which is based on the dollar value of revenue from
clients and/or matters the partners have brought into the firm.45 A partner
receives “origination credit” in the compensation process for those clients
or matters, regardless of who is working on the matter. The credit some-
times ends after a certain period of time, but can continue indefinitely as
long as the client continues to send work to the law firm. One early theory
on why origination first entered the compensation calculation is that by pro-
viding origination credits, firms would encourage lawyers to share work
instead of hoarding it to maximize the amount of hours they billed.46 Origi-
nation credit plays a dominant role in many firms’ compensation systems.47
Personal Production. Since law firms’ business models are largely
based on billable hours, a key aspect of virtually all subjective (and for-
mulaic) compensation systems is the amount of time a lawyer bills over the
course of the evaluation period. Sometimes firms also look at the percent-
age of fees charged that the client actually pays, to account for the fact that
clients do not always pay for all billable time spent on their matters. They
may refuse to pay certain parts of the bill, for instance, if they view the fees
as unreasonably high. Sometimes, in anticipation of client resistance, an
attorney may reduce the bill before it is sent out to the client. Focusing on
realization rather than simply billable hours is therefore a better reflection
of a partner’s financial contribution.
Management Credit. Some firms provide credit for managing a client
matter, even if the partner did not bring the client in the door and therefore
does not qualify for origination credits. In this way, the firm rewards part-
ners who play a large role in ensuring that a client’s needs are being met on
an ongoing basis, even if they were not involved in bringing the client to the
firm initially. Another version of this factor is to give a partner credit for
hours billed by lawyers who are actively under his supervision.
Additional Factors. Subjective components in compensation systems
enable firms to also reward behavior that is not easily measured. Firms em-
ploying these systems have discretion to take into account factors in addi-
tion to those that are explicitly identified. These factors generally relate to
firm citizenship activity, such as serving on committees or undertaking
projects for the firm, and cooperation with colleagues. Some firms also in-
clude pro bono work in this category.
45. Law firms tend to place much greater weight on revenue than profitability in the compen-
sation process. Traditionally, the profitability of matters and clients has been difficult to determine
due to disagreements over the distribution of firm-wide costs such as office space, secretaries, etc.
46. Reginald Heber Smith, Law Office Organization, IV, 26 A.B.A. J. 648, 650 (1940).
47. Jeffery A. Lowe, 2012 Partner Compensation Survey, MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFRICA (2012)
http://www.mlaglobal.com/partner-compensation-survey/2012/FullReport.pdf.
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2. The Compensation Process
Compensation for equity partners in systems that incorporate subjec-
tive factors is generally decided by a group of partners on the compensation
committee, which is typically comprised of managers and/or rainmakers in
the firm. The members of the committee can be elected by the partnership
or appointed by the executive or top management committee in the firm.48
Some firms may have a mix of law firm leaders and other partners other-
wise not in management roles that are elected specifically to the compensa-
tion committee. Most firms go to great lengths to ensure that decisions
about the composition of the compensation committee are regarded as
legitimate.
In conducting its deliberations, the committee gathers data from the
firm’s operational and financial systems (such as billable hours, realization,
origination, etc.). Typically these data are augmented by interviews with
partners and practice leaders in the firm. Some firms encourage partners to
write a memo to the committee detailing their accomplishments that might
not otherwise appear obvious from the data. The compensation decisions
are then discussed in what is often painstaking detail and can require hun-
dreds of hours of work by the committee.49
Compensation in subjective systems is typically a prospective process.
That is, the compensation committee decides at the beginning of the year
how many shares are allocated to each equity partner, based on the partner’s
performance during the most relevant recent period. The ultimate annual
value of each share therefore depends on the financial performance of the
firm over the course of the coming year.
Many firms allocate shares every year, but some firms go through the
process once every two to three years. Some firms attempt to smooth out
the peaks and valleys in individual performance by basing compensation
decisions on averages for two or three prior years. Our research, however,
suggests that competitive pressures may be prompting firms to focus on
briefer periods so that compensation can be adjusted more quickly to reflect
recent performance.50 Many firms also reserve some portion of partner
48. In some firms, the executive committee also functions as the compensation committee.
49. See generally ASHISH NANDA & LISA ROHRER, ROBINSON & WHITE (A): PAY FOR PER-
FORMANCE (Harvard Law School, 2012); ASHISH NANDA & LISA ROHRER, ROBINSON & WHITE
(B): COMPENSATION REVIEW (Harvard Law School, 2012) (providing examples of a large U.S. law
firm’s approach to compensation decision-making).
50. As one partner reflected, “It has always been that people didn’t move up very fast but
they didn’t move down very fast, that was our mantra. The last three or four years have changed
that . . . .We used to look at five-year data, now we look more at three-year data because . . . what
happened five years ago, pre-2008, is not very relevant. We’re looking at what’s happening now
right [sic]. It’s not exactly what have you done for me lately but . . . you don’t want to artificially
keep [someone who is increasing in value to the firm] down because three years ago they hadn’t
been doing much . . . . [Y]ou’ve got to be responsive to that or they’re walking out the door.”
Interview 10 at 16 (Aug. 28, 2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 20 14-NOV-13 12:16
2012] MONEY AND MEANING 93
profits for a bonus pool, which can be used to reward stellar performance
during the year that was not foreseen in the unit allocation process (for
example, landing a very large client in the middle of the year).
3. Transparency in Compensation
A key distinction among compensation systems in the United States
and Canada is the extent to which firms disclose equity partner compensa-
tion to equity partners. For the lockstep and formula firms that predominate
in other parts of the world, this issue is less meaningful since there is no
discretionary component to those systems. In the majority of U.S. firms,
equity partner compensation is an “open” system in which data are shared
openly among the members of the partnership.51 Some firms have adopted a
partially-open system. One variation of a partially-open system is where
compensation is generally not shared, but partners can view the distribution
by visiting the managing partner’s office if they wish. Another variation is
sharing the partner metrics openly (billable hours, origination, etc.) while
the compensation decisions themselves are kept private. These partially
open systems are fairly rare, however.52
While most firms share compensation data, a significant minority (ap-
proximately 14 percent by one recent account53) do not disclose compensa-
tion to the partnership. These firms are known as “closed” compensation or
“black box” firms. The theory behind this approach is that open sharing of
comparison information inevitably breeds some dissatisfaction and even re-
sentment, which can undermine cooperation in the firm. Closed compensa-
tion has other benefits. According to an interview, Richard Rosenbaum, the
CEO of Greenberg Traurig, prefers his firm’s black box system: “This al-
lows us to run what is a large business in many disparate locations and
practices without politics and without visible competition between our
shareholders. This has been a major plus in our culture. It allows us to make
decisions that make sense to the market.”54 Thus, closed systems can give
the leadership team latitude to compensate certain partners in line with the
market, regardless of the opinions of other partners in the firm.
Since the compensation committee meets in private, all subjective sys-
tems lack transparency in terms of how decisions are actually made in indi-
vidual instances. This creates some ambiguity about what type of behavior
the firm is actually rewarding. Research on compensation, however, indi-
cates that the majority of partners believe that originations are the most
important component of equity partner compensation decisions.55 When
51. Wesemann & Jarrett-Kerr, supra note 42, at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Julie Kay, Greenberg CEO Richard Rosenbaum Discusses Finances, Internal Controls
and the Future, DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 20, 2012, at 2.
55. Lowe, 2012 Partner Compensation Survey, supra note 47, at 8.
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asked about the factors that go into calculating equity partner compensation,
one partner in the present study replied:
As far as I understand it—and there are guidelines but I don’t
know . . . how strictly they are followed—it’s basically how much
money did you get credited for as an originator. Everybody wants
origination credit and that is where the money comes from. If you
have a lot of origination credit you get paid more, which is why
people run around fighting to get origination credit and are jeal-
ous in regard to their clients . . . .56
When originations play a large role in compensation, the stakes can be
high. As one partner noted, “[Y]ou just can’t work enough hours to make
the big money . . . at any law firm. You have to have the originations or
you’re the billing partner [because] those are the numbers that really drive
the compensation of various different partners . . . .”57 According to a recent
survey of over 2,000 law firm partners by legal search consultants Major,
Lindsey & Africa, the impact of originations on compensation has been
growing in recent years. Over half (55 percent) of respondents who reported
that compensation criteria had recently changed stated that originations
were taking on a larger role in 2012, up from 24 percent who responded
similarly in a 2010 survey.58 Sixty-five percent of all respondents reported
that origination credit was the most important factor driving compensation
in 2012.59
The effective result of this dynamic is effectively a two-tiered equity
partner compensation system. Rainmakers (the “Finders”) with a large
number of origination credits generally earn substantially more than service
partners (“the Minders” and “the Grinders”), whose compensation is based
mainly on the number of hours that they bill. This arrangement reflects the
influence of an active lateral market for rainmakers. In response to this mar-
ket, a firm needs to be able both to keep its key partners from defecting and
to attract profitable ones from other firms. It therefore has to make sure it is
paying its valued partners market rates, and that it has the flexibility to pay
top rates for laterals it wishes to lure to the firm.
As firms compete for top rainmakers, they are increasingly likely to
reward their most important rainmakers more highly than the average part-
ner, and to pay them significantly more than the lowest-paid one. The dif-
ference between the equity partners with the highest and lowest
compensation is known as “the spread.” Many firms traditionally had a rel-
atively small spread of 3:1 or perhaps 4:1. Recent research suggests that
spreads have moved considerably further apart, with an average in 2011 of
56. Interview 21 at 6 (Aug. 7, 2012).
57. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 4.
58. Lowe, supra note 47, at 31.
59. Id. at 30.
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10:1 and some firms reporting spreads as wide as 30:1.60 These greater
spreads reflect increasingly more weight given to origination in the calcula-
tion of compensation. As one partner remarks:
[T]oday, to attract top talent, you are in a bidding war situation
that you may not have been in ten years ago. It’s a different world
in that sense, because getting work from big multinational . . .
companies is a ticket to generating revenues in a way that may
not be the case with smaller companies . . . . [I]f our business
model now is that we’re competing with global firms for partners,
we have to pay partners these big amounts of money.61
This bidding war for laterals can have adverse effects on “homegrown”
partners. According to another partner:
[Y]ou typically expand by cherry picking your people from other
law firms and . . . if we’re cherry picking these people, then
we’ve got to pay these people a premium to bring those people in.
So that means we can give a short shrift to people who have been
here for a long time . . . .62
C. The Internal Market of the Firm
Origination credits and personal production based on billable hours are
the two main inputs that determine partner compensation in non-lockstep
firms. While each of these factors appears relatively objective on the sur-
face, a closer examination reveals that each is the product of a set of com-
plex interactions among partners in the firm. These interactions constitute a
relatively unregulated market in which partners negotiate, and sometimes
compete, for origination credit, relationships with clients, and a steady
stream of work. The value of a partner’s services affects his bargaining
power in requesting a share of origination credits and obtaining work from
other partners that increases his billable hours. While firms make some at-
tempt to regulate this internal market, most partners regard it as being ulti-
mately dominated by informal bargaining.
The simplest instance of origination credit is when a partner by himself
brings in a matter that involves a client that is new to the firm. The partner
receives all origination credit for that matter, and this credit is then factored
into compensation decisions. If additional matters arise for which the client
needs assistance from other lawyers in the firm, the partner who brought in
the first matter will generally continue to receive origination credits based
on the value of those additional matters.
60. Aric Press, The Am Law 200: A Chasm with Consequences, AM. LAW., June 1, 2011, at
63.
61. Interview 71 at 13 (Apr. 6, 2012).
62. Interview 72, supra note 23, at 11.
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Whether a partner will share any of that credit with the partners doing
the work on these other matters will depend on informal discussion, and
perhaps negotiation, between the rainmaker and his other partners. One
partner’s description captures the ambiguity and personal judgment that is
involved in origination sharing as she described someone she spoke to from
a newly acquired foreign office:
[S]he said, “I just got something for someone in the U.S. to do for
one of my clients; I think I’ll just maybe take . . . five percent of
the origination[ ] [credit] because I’m not going to do any of the
work.” And I said, “No, you have to take at least 50 [percent] . . .
because it’s your client [and] that’s what people do here.”63
A partner in another firm agrees:
It’s constantly negotiated. I’ve only, only in the last few years
have I started really dealing with this origination mess, it’s a
mess. Everybody is fighting for a piece of this and I deserve this,
there are legacy people who do have origination credit even
though they don’t do anything, it’s just their old client.64
The outcome of origination negotiations is a function of how generous
the rainmaker is, as well as practical considerations like how scarce the
skills are of the other partners he needs to work on the new matters, how
often he expects that he will need to call on them again, and whether he
expects them to refer work from their own clients to him in the future. Firm
norms and culture play a role as well, as illustrated by the partner’s com-
ment above: “That’s what people do here.”
A team comprised of different partners from the firm may also make a
presentation, or “pitch,” in an effort to win business from a new client. If
the work involves a corporate matter, for example, the effort may be led by
a partner with an especially strong reputation for work on mergers and ac-
quisitions. Other partners on the team might be those who have expertise in
a particular area that is relevant to the matter, such as a specific regulatory
regime, treatment under the tax law, or the form of financing that would be
suitable for a transaction. Of lawyers with such expertise, the lead partners
may select for the presentation those with whom they have worked in the
past.
If the firm wins the business, origination credit ordinarily will go to the
corporate partner who was seen as leading the pitch, because of the view
that his reputation was the most important reason that the client chose the
firm. This partner may be regarded as having the best chance of developing
an ongoing relationship with the client, or it may be that the firm wants to
ensure that this partner is satisfied with his compensation. To the extent that
the firm grows relationships with existing clients, the partners who already
63. Interview 92 at 17 (June 6, 2012).
64. Interview 21, supra note 56, at 7.
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have the most origination credits are in the best position to accumulate
more of them. If the firm does not revise this allocation, and if other part-
ners on the pitch team are unable to negotiate for a share of credits, the
perception of some partners may be, as one partner put it, “The rich get
richer.”
Some firms attempt to lessen the need for negotiation over origination
credits by awarding management credit to the main partners working on or
managing matters for major clients. While this type of credit may enhance
the recipients’ compensation, it typically has a less substantial impact on
compensation calculations than do origination credits. Other firms may im-
pose a “sunset” provision, which places a time limit on the period in which
the firm grants origination credits, while some may require a minimum
amount of rainmaker involvement with a client’s matter in order to be eligi-
ble for credits derived from it.
Firms also attempt to varying degrees to encourage rainmakers to
share credits with others. Some provide guidelines that indicate how origi-
nation credit should be divided in certain situations,65 while others rely on
more general exhortations to be fair. On occasion, a compensation commit-
tee may adjust a partner’s compensation because it believes that he has been
unfairly hoarding origination credits for himself. One committee member
reports, “[W]e talk to people about being hogs and we tell them that they
get punished when they are hogs . . . . [We tell them], ‘[Y]ou might have
made this but you’re making this because you’re not a team player.’”66 The
partner goes on to give an example:
[T]his person thinks they are the billing attorney, but they really
don’t have much responsibility anymore, so we look at that. We
get the self-evaluations and we look at that, but in addition to the
numbers we get all of the backup behind the numbers. So that if
somebody claims to be billing attorney for X Corp we kind of
know if they really are or if they aren’t. So somebody will say,
“Well, geez, my numbers are so spectacular.” And we’ll say,
“Well, yeah, but you don’t even know who the general counsel is
anymore at the client and it’s really so and so who should get
credit.”67
Another partner describes one instance in which the firm refused to
credit a partner for all the origination credit that he claimed because the
committee felt the lawyers around the partner deserved more compensation
than they otherwise would have received:
One partner . . . had two younger partners and his practice overall
was down and he did as much as he could himself and took all the
65. See generally NANDA & ROHRER, COMPENSATION REVIEW, supra note 49 (providing ex-
amples of a large U.S. law firm’s approach to compensation decision-making).
66. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 5.
67. Id. at 7.
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origination credit for himself. His younger partners had about
1400 billable hours each [and] he had like 3200; he had six mil-
lion dollars of originated business [and] they had $450,000 each,
and they were in a team. At first, if you just looked at the num-
bers, the guy would have gotten a very high six-figure bonus
based on his base compensation. And they would have got noth-
ing and they would have gotten dinged because they were none-
quity partners.  Over the course of the two months that reviews
for compensation took place he lost what I think was about
$600,000.68
Another example in which a firm may have no choice but to be in-
volved in the allocation of origination credits is when a lateral partner en-
ters the firm. One partner describes a common scenario:
[T]he hardest areas are where the firm represents a company, has
a set of relationships, and a [new] partner comes into the firm
who has a different relationship with the same company . . . .
[T]his partner starts selling his [client] contact about his relation-
ship [with the new firm] and says, “We already represent you, so
you should give us some work,” and then a new piece of work
comes in.
There is no formula for that but . . . there is also what’s the
right way to behave. I mean you are a team . . . . [I]f you were
doing things right you just would split it . . . . What I try to do is
get people ahead of the ball here to recognize there are these rules
and to call me when they have questions or somebody is treating
them badly.69
For several reasons, however, firms tend to be deferential to partners
with respect to the allocation of origination credits between lawyers already
in the firm. First, it is impossible to specify in advance an appropriate divi-
sion of origination credits, given the myriad kinds of situations and forms of
partner collaborations that arise. A firm that actively monitored the division
of credits would therefore need to spend substantial time analyzing the facts
of each particular situation. Second, in a firm comprised of professionals
accustomed to a large measure of independence, law firm leaders generally
assume that informal agreements by partners involved are likely to be re-
garded as more legitimate bases for the distribution of credits than an edict
by management. Third, firms encourage partners to seek out new clients
and want to avoid adopting any policy that may create a disincentive for
them to do so. Finally, firms are also quite sensitive to the risk that a rain-
maker who generates significant business may bristle at what he regards as
interference with his judgment about origination credits, and that he may
respond by leaving the firm.
68. Interview 105 at 13 (Aug. 29, 2012).
69. Id. at 12.
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Law firm management may exhibit similar restraint in attempting to
ensure that service partners have enough billable hours. Firms generally
take the view that a partner who has a relationship with a client is the best
judge of who will be most helpful in performing the work that needs to be
done. As one partner comments:
[W]e want to keep people busy . . . many of our people are quite
versatile and they can do lots of things. But I never, ever say to a
practice leader or substantial person who has a case, “I want you
to use X. I know you don’t want to use X but damn it, you use
X.” That is not the way we operate here. It’s persuasion some-
times, cajolery sometimes, but I’m not saying to a substantial per-
son, “Use X.”70
This tendency toward deference leads most service partners to regard
the internal market of the firm as largely unregulated, dependent on infor-
mal negotiations and bargaining power.  One income partner describes it
this way:
[W]hat’s interesting . . . as an associate, you are in a regulated
world. As a partner, you’re in a completely deregulated world
. . . . It’s a completely free market system . . . . I spend more time
trying to gather up work internally than I do externally because
obviously it’s just better; the odds are better. [T]he problem with
it is that I am competing against fellow partners, and the thing
is—and this is not just the junior partners saying this; I think se-
nior partners say this—is that you’re not worried about competi-
tion outside of this building; you’re worried about competition
inside the building.71
Belief that the process is unregulated gives rise to some partners’ sense
that the allocation of origination credits in particular can be quite unpredict-
able. When asked how much sharing of origination credits there is in his
firm, one income partner replied:
Well it depends on the person . . . . There is sort of a guideline of
what it should be, but how it actually is, really is—it depends on
who you are, which group you’re in, which other partner you’re
dealing with, etc., etc. And there are so many different factors. [I]
would like to be able to say if you are doing this amount of work
on this project then you are going to get this cut of originations
but that’s not the case . . . . It is completely unpredictable. It’s the
wild, wild west.72
Another partner describes his different experiences when working as
part of two teams attempting to win new business from an existing client:
70. Interview 10, supra note 50, at 5.
71. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 13.
72. Id. at 5.
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[I]f I’m an originator, it means somehow I was important to the
decision to select us. So it may have been the relationship partner
doing the pitch, but he had me front and center in the pitch book.
[He’s saying], “Here is the reason you should choose us over
somebody else because we’ve got the corporate team and then
we’ve got [this partner] on the regulatory team to support it.” And
you know, that relationship partner happens to be generous and he
does things right.
[On the other hand, there was] this transaction I was not in-
volved in originating the matter, but I was instrumental to getting
it done. Now if I was that other partner, I would revise origination
to reflect [my] role, but he chose not to do that.  So, you know,
it’s a crap shoot . . . .73
The bargaining leverage of partners seeking origination credit from
rainmakers will depend upon the size of a new matter, its significance in
terms of the business strategy of the firm, how crucial services of the non-
rainmaker are, whether this partner is in a position to refer work in the
future to the first partner, and the personal relationship between the two
partners. It may also depend upon the importance of the role one partner
plays in the ongoing work of the partner who is entitled to the origination
credit. A partner who regularly serves as a key lieutenant is more likely to
receive some credit than a partner who works occasionally on a narrow
technical aspect of a matter.
The bargaining leverage of a service partner will also depend on the
availability of other partners who are available to do work for a rainmaker.
The most significant component of a service partner’s compensation is the
amount of revenues that she generates from the hours she bills. A service
partner therefore needs a steady flow of work from rainmakers. This need
may inhibit her from pushing too hard for origination credit with a rain-
maker, for fear that she will develop a reputation that leads such partners to
turn to someone less demanding when they need help.
Unfortunately, service partners generally do not have the leverage
within the firm to bargain if they are unhappy, particularly if they work
primarily with one or two rainmakers who “feed” them work on a regular
basis. Should these rainmakers decide to leave, a service partner realisti-
cally needs to follow them or find herself without a source of work in the
firm. Likewise, a service partner without her own book of business is not
terribly attractive on the lateral market. She therefore has limited ability to
leave for another firm. One income partner describes his experience when
he gets called by headhunters. “Well, let me tell you what the conversation
is like. . . . [A headhunter will say], ‘Hey, you have a great background,
great resume, blah, blah, blah,’ and then the moment I say, ‘I don’t have
73. Interview 103, supra note 36, at 6.
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any portable book of business,’ [they say], ‘Oh nice knowing you.’
Click.”74
The internal market of the firm thus has an important influence on the
most important numbers that are used by the firm in setting partner com-
pensation. Unlike the firm’s formal determination of compensation, how-
ever, the internal market is regarded by most partners as largely
unregulated. Many firms attempt to encourage partners to share origination
credit, but firms are generally uneasy about explicitly overriding a partner’s
decision about the division of credits. Most outcomes in the internal market
therefore reflect individual personalities and informal negotiation.
D. Compensation and Organizational Fragility
When asked what holds large, geographically diverse firms together,
many partners refer to compensation. As one partner reflects:
[M]oney is really everything. Money is at the heart of the good
things and the bad things and you can have the greatest culture in
the world but if people don’t think the compensation is fair, cul-
ture goes by the wayside, tone at the top goes by the wayside, I
mean everything just does.75
Intense competition and the mobility of rainmakers make it imperative
that a firm convince its partners on an ongoing basis that it provides the best
platform for maximizing their income. Convincing key rainmakers of this is
crucial, of course, since their departure could cripple or destroy the firm.
Ensuring the allegiance of other partners to the firm can also be important
because they most frequently oversee the delivery of work for key clients.
Compensation in the modern law firm therefore constitutes a material
economy whose distribution of financial rewards is significantly shaped by
the desire to satisfy rainmakers in the firm and to attract them from other
firms. Firms see themselves as having no choice but to operate compensa-
tion systems with these features. As one income partner acknowledges:
[While] we try to balance [it with] preserving our culture . . . but
the reality is that we have to adapt to the way that the economics
of the law firm industry are moving . . . . [Y]ou can’t just sort of
put your head in the sand and just plug your ears and say, “No,
no, we’re just going to keep doing it the way that we did it ten
years ago because that is how we like to do it, we don’t change.”
You do that, then eventually you’ll just be a dinosaur. So you
have no choice but to adapt.76
To the extent that a firm’s compensation process can distribute finan-
cial rewards in the material economy that keeps partners satisfied, the firm
74. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 16.
75. Interview 6 at 45 (July 13, 2009).
76. Interview 71, supra note 61, at 20.
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will be able to build some glue that holds it together. If the firm can provide
no other basis for partners’ sense of connection to it, however, this glue can
be weak. Partners who identify with a firm solely because of the opportu-
nity that it provides to gain material rewards have a purely extrinsic motiva-
tion to be loyal to the firm.77 Their loyalty is based not on the belief that the
firm is intrinsically worthy of allegiance, but on the view that remaining at
the firm will lead to the “separable outcome”78 of obtaining satisfactory
compensation. Research indicates that the effect of compensation on extrin-
sic and intrinsic motivation can be complex.79 The point here is simply that
a firm that emphasizes financial reward as its central unifying value is
likely to elicit an attachment to the firm based on extrinsic motivation.
There are limits to the attachment that extrinsic motivation can create.
First, reducing the reward will result in less attachment. Withdrawing the
reward may undermine attachment entirely. If a firm does not explicitly
reward referral of work to other partners, for instance, partners may not do
it unless it would directly benefit them.
A second limit of extrinsic motivation is that a firm will get exactly the
behavior that it rewards and no more. People moved by extrinsic motivation
will act to maximize the amount of the reward they receive. They may not
engage in valuable behavior that is not specifically rewarded—even though
it is in the best interest of the firm.80 For example, someone may share
origination credits, but only the minimum necessary to get compensation
credit for it.  Being more generous could help strengthen ties among the
partners and promote cooperation that benefits the firm.  Because there is
no immediate payoff for acting that way, however, it does not happen.
Someone moved only by extrinsic motivation may therefore engage
only in behavior for which he explicitly gains compensation credit. He is
unlikely to possess the loyalty that can result in what is called “organiza-
tional citizenship,”81 which is behavior benefiting the firm that goes beyond
what earns a financial reward.
It is risky when partners’ commitment to a firm is based only on ex-
trinsic motivation. The health of a firm depends crucially on the willingness
77. See generally Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation:
Classic Definitions and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54 (2000) (discussing
different forms of motivation).
78. Id. at 60.
79. See generally BARRY GERHART & SARA L. RYNES, COMPENSATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS (Peter J. Frost et al. eds., 2003) (providing a comprehensive, re-
search-based review of the determinants and effects of compensation).
80. See John R. Deckop et al., Getting More than You Pay For: Organizational Citizenship
Behavior and Pay-for-Performance Plans, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 420 (1999); Jennifer M. George &
Garreth R. Jones, Organizational Spontaneity in Context, 10 HUM. PERFORMANCE 153 (1997).
81. See Nathan P. Podsakoff et al., Individual- and Organizational-Level Consequences of
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: A Meta-Analysis, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 122 (2009);
Mark C. Bolino et al., Citizenship Behavior and the Creation of Social Capital in Organizations,
27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 505 (2002).
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of its partners to act for the benefit of the firm in ways that cannot be fully
specified in advance. Partners may need to be creative in responding to
unforeseen threats and opportunities. Their ability to do so, however, may
be impaired if they are accustomed to using compensation criteria as their
guide for behavior.82 If a firm that is bound together only by extrinsic moti-
vation encounters financial difficulty, partners are likely to look fairly
quickly for their own exit options.
If keeping partners satisfied with compensation is crucial to creating
law firm glue, and if compensation has only material meaning to partners,
the modern law firm can foster only a tenuous sense of connection between
its partners and the firm. Any partner allegiance is contingent on the out-
come of an ongoing calculation of the costs and benefits of pursuing the
firm’s interest. For rainmakers, this calculation will determine if they re-
main with the firm. For other partners with fewer opportunities elsewhere, it
will determine if they cooperate with one another or pursue their own indi-
vidual interest. In either case, loyalty to the firm that generates intrinsic
motivation will be minimal. The increasingly important material role of
compensation in the modern law firm thus illuminates one important reason
why law firms can be so fragile.
Assuming that partners are moved only by financial concerns, how-
ever, misreads both the meaning of compensation and the more complex set
of motivations that influence modern law firm partners. As the next section
describes, compensation has symbolic, not simply material, significance for
law firm partners. It is part of a complex moral economy that distributes
respect among partners. Decisions and negotiations about compensation are
not simply about money, but about the extent to which business skills and
more traditional professional skills form the bases on which respect is allo-
cated in a given law firm. In this respect, they represent discourse about the
meaning of professionalism in that firm. The symbolic role of compensation
also creates the possibility that a firm’s compensation process can elicit a
more durable form of loyalty from its partners than one based simply on the
material rewards that the firm provides.
III. THE MORAL ECONOMY OF COMPENSATION
A. Overview
Conceptualizing law firm compensation as comprising only a firm’s
material economy is consistent with the tendency to assume that “the func-
tions and characteristics of money are defined strictly in economic terms.”83
82. Teresa M. Amabile, How to Kill Creativity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 79.
83. VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE MEANING OF MONEY 11 (1994); see also Bruce G. Carruthers &
Wendy Nelson Espeland, Money, Meaning, and Morality, 41 AMER. BEH. SCI. 1384, 1387 (1998)
(“modern money is characterized by most scholars as anonymous, homogeneous, fungible, and
universal”) (footnote omitted).
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As Viviana Zelizer has suggested, the result of this assumption is that
“[e]ven when the symbolic meaning of money is recognized, it either re-
mains restricted to the economic sphere or is treated as a largely inconse-
quential feature.”84 This reflects the tendency to establish “[a] sharp
dichotomy . . . between money and nonpecuniary values. Money in modern
society is defined as essentially profane and utilitarian in contrast to nonin-
strumental values.”85 In addition, Zelizer argues:
Monetary concerns are seen as constantly enlarging, quantifying,
and often corrupting all areas of life . . . . There is no question
about the power of money to transform nonpecuniary values,
whereas the reciprocal transformation of money by values or so-
cial relations is seldom conceptualized or else explicitly
rejected.86
These assumptions underlie the claim that the greater significance of
financial considerations in law firms reflects the obliteration of
noneconomic values in the sensibilities of the lawyers who practice in them.
Assuming that pecuniary values have unqualified dominance leads to the
view that compensation has meaning only insofar as it reflects the operation
of the material economy within the firm. This is consistent with the com-
mon lament that law firm practice has degenerated from a profession to a
business.87
Research suggests, however, that money has complicated meanings
beyond its material significance. One scholar suggests, “Money is probably
the most emotionally meaningful object in contemporary life: only food and
sex are its close competitors as common carriers of such strong and diverse
feelings, significance, and strivings.”88 Furthermore, those meanings are not
merely the product of idiosyncratic individual interpretations. Rather, they
arise as a result of one’s location in social relationships. Two other scholars
observe, “Like all other social objects, money has meaning that depends on
its use and context.”89 As a result, “it is misguided to try and identify uni-
versally representational properties of money and link these to its meaning.
The meaning of money does not depend on some characteristic that is com-
84. ZELIZER, supra note 83, at 11.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id.
87. For a discussion of the history of this discourse, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms,
Competition Penalties, and the Values of Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 24–33
(1999).
88. David W. Krueger, Money, Success and Success Phobia, in THE LAST TABOO: MONEY AS
A SYMBOL AND REALITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 3, 3 (David W. Krueger ed.,
1986); see also ADRIAN FURNHAM & MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY (1998);
Terence R. Mitchell & Amy E. Mickel, The Meaning of Money: An Individual-Difference Per-
spective, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 568 (1999).
89. Carruthers & Espeland, supra note 83, at 1386.
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mon to all money. Instead, its meaning depends on what people in a particu-
lar context do with it.”90
As we argue below, the compensation process has significant meaning
for a law partner as constituting a moral economy that communicates the
extent to which he is valued and respected within the firm. This economy
serves to allocate two forms of respect: impersonal and personal. It allo-
cates impersonal respect to the extent that partners believe that compensa-
tion is awarded fairly. A partner who concludes that she has been
compensated fairly believes that she has been treated consistently with how
other partners in the firm are treated. This belief enables her to have confi-
dence that she works at a firm in which each person’s contributions will be
evaluated by a common standard that is impartially applied. For her, the
firm’s compensation process reflects the value of formal equality: the firm
doesn’t play favorites or base compensation on criteria unrelated to the mer-
its.91 This communicates a sense of impersonal respect. It inspires confi-
dence that all partners’ contributions will be appropriately rewarded, and
that their compensation will not be based on special pleading, political con-
siderations, or the influence of individual personalities.
The moral economy allocates personal respect to the extent that a part-
ner believes that his compensation reflects ways in which he contributes to
the success of the firm. This form of contribution is not fully captured in the
quantifiable factors that serve as inputs into the compensation decision. It
involves less easily measured behavior such as generosity with colleagues,
effectively collaborating with others, mentoring junior lawyers, doing high-
quality legal work, assuming responsibilities on behalf of the firm, and in-
volvement in community and pro bono activities. A firm that recognizes the
importance of these traditional professional values affords a partner per-
sonal respect by providing assurance that his compensation will not be de-
termined solely by readily quantifiable metrics that focus solely on
profitability.
One reason why compensation has such powerful significance is the
lack of other formal feedback mechanisms in law firms.92 In many firms,
compensation is an important, if not the sole, indicator of performance. “I
think of compensation as your review,” remarked one income partner. “[A]s
a partner, no one tells you how you are doing or how you are doing com-
90. Id. at 1387.
91. It is noteworthy that a comprehensive recent survey of law firm compensation declares
that “[c]ronyism continues to be, by far, the most significant reason for dissatisfaction with com-
pensation satisfaction, outpacing all of the other enumerated reasons combined.”  Lowe, supra
note 47, at 7.
92. See THOMAS J. DELONG ET AL., WHEN PROFESSIONALS HAVE TO LEAD: A NEW MODEL
FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 164 (2007) (discussing the need for mid-career feedback at professional
service firms).
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pared to other people . . . . So when you get your compensation you find
out . . . do you value me, do you think I am doing a good job.”93
Another reason that compensation carries such importance in law firms
is that firms generally lack other ways of signaling recognition for partners.
Corporate enterprises, for instance, can often rely on special awards, selec-
tive training opportunities, promotions, or new titles to convey respect for
accomplishment. Law firms, however, are relatively flat organizations with-
out the highly differentiated organizational positions and titles that charac-
terize the corporate world. Promotions and other forms of advancement are
therefore less frequent and important, as are special training programs asso-
ciated with them.
Understanding the operation of the moral economy helps provide a
richer and more subtle portrait of the complex cognitive universe that law
firm partners inhabit and the forms of motivation and satisfaction that law
practice can provide them. In particular, it suggests that struggles over com-
pensation are in part struggles over the relative weight the firm should give
to business skills and traditional professional values. As such, these contests
represent efforts to define the boundaries of the potentially all-encompass-
ing influence of financial imperatives in the modern law firm.
Furthermore, appreciating compensation as comprising a moral econ-
omy may also illuminate sources of organizational stability and lessen the
fragility of modern law firms.  To the extent that partners’ satisfaction with
compensation reflects satisfaction with their place in the moral economy,
they may develop deeper ties to a firm that do not depend solely on the
firm’s ability to maximize their financial welfare. These ties provide them
with intrinsic motivation to act for the benefit of the firm, not simply moti-
vation based on the desire for a reward. They can nurture a sense of loyalty
that is deeper than a contingent allegiance based solely on self-interest.
Such loyalty can serve as a buffer against the many centrifugal forces to
which law firms are subject.
While the law firm compensation decision is an important part of the
moral economy of compensation, it is not the only one. As we have seen,
much of the activity that affects partner compensation occurs on the indi-
vidual partner level in the internal market for origination credits and billable
hours. Partners have wide latitude in how they behave in this market; many
partners are skeptical that firms’ exhortations to share credit and work actu-
ally create any widespread ethos of generosity. There are, however, limits to
how far firms can push partners to behave magnanimously in this market,
given the ever-present risk that a rainmaker may decide to leave for another
firm with less demanding management. This can present a challenge to
firms that seek to convey professional respect to partners through the com-
pensation process.
93. Interview 87 at 11 (June 5, 2012).
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The moral economy of compensation, in other words, operates on two
levels. The first is the firm’s process for determining compensation. The
second is the informal bargaining over origination credits and billable
hours. The first level is regulated by a central authority, which means that
the firm has the ability directly to determine outcomes. The latter level,
however, is largely unregulated, which means that the firm must rely more
on attempts to inculcate informal norms and organizational culture to affect
behavior.
B. Money and Respect
Conceptualizing compensation as part of a moral economy reflects ap-
preciation that a partner may regard compensation as not simply the amount
of financial reward that he receives, but as a judgment about his value as a
lawyer. Within this economy, a partner’s preoccupation with compensation
reflects concern about the professional respect he enjoys within the firm.
This respect can be the basis for what researchers call “organization-based
self-esteem.” While general self-esteem reflects “the extent to which an in-
dividual believes him/herself to be capable, significant and worthy,” organi-
zation-based self-esteem reflects “an assessment of personal adequacy and
worthiness as an organizational member. Thus, employees with high organ-
ization-based self-esteem have come to believe that they are important,
meaningful and worthwhile within their employing organization.”94
Law firm partners may be especially inclined to interpret compensa-
tion in this way. Most firms lack a robust system for providing the kind of
meaningful, timely feedback on partner performance that is more common
in other professional service firms such as accounting and management
consulting organizations. Firms instead tend to assume that any messages
about performance that need to be sent can be communicated by the amount
of compensation that the firm provides.
Many partners may therefore lack any clear sense of how well they are
doing other than by how well they are compensated. As one partner put it,
“We suffer from an imposter complex; we fear that some day we are all
going to be found out for the frauds that we are. We are all insecure, we all
seek validation, and the way we measure our validation is by the way we
are compensated.”95 One partner recounts how he would have reacted had
the firm paid him less than the amount that he calculated he was due:
[I]f I had gotten less than I had asked for in that example I gave
you, I’m sure I would have felt like they are not valuing my work
at the level they should. This is where it gets very individualistic.
I tend to think, based on my life experience, that people are heav-
94. Donald G. Gardner et al., The Effects of Pay Level on Organization-Based Self-Esteem
and Performance: A Field Study, 77 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 307, 310 (2004).
95. Interview 79, supra note 9, at 19.
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ily motived by a sense of self-worth and wanting to be liked by
people. I think it’s very deeply seated stuff that goes on, and com-
pensation is kind of an objective measure of that.96
This sense of value is described by a partner as being a member of an
“in group” within the firm:
[T]he sense I get among the equity partners is that there is a lot of
value given to the number of shares that somebody has, and I
think you know it’s basically a measuring stick right. I mean, it’s
just status . . . . And so that is part of it, and I think if you are
being well compensated, then you’re being well liked by certain
people, and if you are not being well compensated for what
you’ve contributed, I think it’s the message [that] you’re not, you
know, one of the favored people . . . . There is a sense that you are
either in the in crowd or you’re in the out crowd.97
A firm that relies on a compensation system other than one based
purely on seniority faces the need to strike a delicate balance in communi-
cating a sense of personal respect through compensation. On the one hand,
research indicates that a person’s sense of being valued by an organization
is strongly affected by comparing himself with others. A system that pro-
vides for sizeable differences in compensation levels thus generally will
send a stronger message about respect than one that does not. Research also
indicates that high achievers prefer pay that is strongly linked to perform-
ance98—and lawyers tend to be high achievers.99 A firm may therefore
want a differentiated compensation system in order to both motivate high
achievers and attract them to the firm.
On the other hand, differences in compensation create the risk that
those who earn less may not feel respected by the firm. This can reduce
their organization-based self-esteem, which can be demoralizing. A partner
may believe, for instance, that she has been loyal to the firm and has en-
gaged in firm citizenship activities for many years. She may feel that the
firm does not value her loyalty, however, because she receives less compen-
sation than an incoming lateral with a big book of business. As one partner
observes:
You see people many people who come in laterally; you have to
entice them with higher compensation, and so you have people
who have worked here for a long time say, “You know, I’ve been
working here for twenty years and now this other person who has
contributed nothing to this firm to date comes in and is making
more money than I am.” . . . And so people say, “Well, they are
96. Interview 94 at 6 (July 12, 2012).
97. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 12–13.
98. Christine Quinn Trank, et al., Attracting Applicants in the War for Talent: Differences in
Work Preferences Among High Achievers, 16 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 331, 342 (2002).
99. See SUSAN DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PER-
SONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 27–28, 41 (Bruce D. Sales, et al. eds., 2004).
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taking loyalty for granted and putting a premium on trading on
your values in the market, so what I should do is threaten to leave
[unless] they’ll pay me more money—or I should leave and then
I’ll come back as a lateral!”100
Similarly, a partner may believe that he is working just as hard as a
colleague who receives higher compensation, but that his lower compensa-
tion signals that the firm does not value his work as highly as it does the
work of his colleague. The resulting blow to organization-based self-esteem
may mean that a partner has less motivation to put forth extra effort to act in
ways that are beneficial to the organization and its clients.
A firm’s compensation system therefore serves in part to signal to part-
ners how much they are valued by the firm and why. This allocation of
respect occurs on two levels: the firm compensation decision and negotia-
tion among partners in an internal market for credit and billable hours.
C. The Firm Compensation Decision
1. Distributive Justice
Research indicates that people’s satisfaction with their compensation
implicitly focuses not on the absolute amount that they receive, but on com-
parison between that amount and the amount they believe they deserve.101
Satisfaction with compensation therefore “is a function of the discrepancy
between perceived pay level and what an employee believes his or her pay
‘should’ be.”102 The smaller the difference between the two, the more likely
a person regards his compensation as fair and the more satisfied he will be.
This sense of satisfaction is based on the judgment that the individual and
the organization have engaged in a fair exchange, in which the individual
makes contributions to an organization in return for comparable financial
rewards.103
How do people determine the amount they think they deserve? Consid-
erable social science research confirms what most of us know intuitively:
how satisfied we are with our compensation depends on how it compares
with the amount that others receive whom we regard as our peers. Equity
theory and social comparison theory posit that, depending on the person
with whom we compare ourselves, “individual responses may be positive,
negative, or neutral.”104
100. Interview 52, supra note 14, at 19.
101. GERHART & RYNES, supra note 79, at 61.
102. Id. at 60–61.
103. Id.
104. Carol T. Kulik & Maureen L. Ambrose, Personal and Situational Determinants of Refer-
ent Choice, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 212, 212 (1992); see generally J. Stacy Adams, Toward an
Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 422 (1963) (generally regarded as
the foundational work in equity theory); Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison
Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954) (the comparable piece in social comparison theory).
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More specifically, “employees attempt to equate their ratios of out-
comes to inputs with the ratios of [a] relevant other[ ],”105 or a “comparison
other.”106 This can be another person or a situation that someone has exper-
ienced in the past or anticipates in the future. Someone regarded as similar
“typically refers to [someone] performing similar tasks at a similar level of
the same organization, but it can also refer to tenure, age, sex, race, and so
forth.”107 The individual first determines his own ratio of perceived “in-
puts” such as effort, ability, and experience to outcomes such as level of
compensation and working conditions. If the ratio between his inputs and
outcomes is the same as the ratio of a comparison other, the individual is
likely to be satisfied. To the extent that his ratio is lower, the individual is
likely to believe that his compensation is unfair.
Individuals can consider a wide range of factors in evaluating both
inputs and outcomes. In deciding what to treat as inputs, for instance, some-
one may take into account considerations such as “personal pay histories,
the pay of those in other occupations in the same organization, pay of others
in the same job in the same organization, pay of others in the same job in
other organizations, [and the] pay of others with lower or higher seniority or
performance.”108
Law firm partners indicate that dissatisfaction with compensation
based on comparison with others is a pervasive feature of law firm life. One
partner describes how preoccupied a colleague can become with how much
someone else makes compared to him: “People can get ridiculously con-
sumed. Why did that person make 50 cents more than I did? [T]he person
who makes 50 cents more cares not at all; the person who made 50 cents
less goes crazy.”109 Another partner observes:
We used to always have this conversation every time someone
would come in and bitch about their compensation. They would
start by saying, “First of all, let me just say I’m making more
money than I ever thought I could—but why is he making five
dollars more than I am?” Lawyers always want to win the gold
star.110
Still another partner comments:
What happens with a lot of lawyers is, you know, you look and
you go, “Wow, I’m making $600,000. That’s a lot of money; I
never thought I would make that much money—but wait a min-
ute, I think that guy next door is making $650,000. Now you
105. Raymond T. Lee & James E. Martin, Internal and External Referents as Predictors of
Pay Satisfaction Among Employees in a Two-Tier Wage Setting, 64 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCH. 57,
58 (1991).
106. GERHART & RYNES, supra note 79, at 61.
107. Chen, Choi & Chi, supra note 15, at 808.
108. GERHART & RYNES, supra note 79, at 61.
109. Interview 14 at 17 (Aug. 19, 2009).
110. Interview 10, supra note 50, at 24.
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know I’m smarter than he is because I got better grades in law
school.” You know how lawyers are.111
A common basis of comparison for compensation purposes is another
individual whom someone regards as similar with respect to contributions,
seniority, or the nature of the job that she performs. Reliance on that person
as the benchmark for comparison will depend on the availability of relevant
information about her.112 For a law firm partner, this person may be some-
one such as a colleague with whom an individual works closely, someone
who has similar responsibilities in another practice group, or someone of
similar seniority. The ratio between this partner’s inputs and her compensa-
tion will serve as the basis for assessing whether one’s own ratio represents
a fair outcome. Regardless of the absolute amount of compensation, a dis-
crepancy can generate a sense of injustice. One income partner, for in-
stance, describes his dissatisfaction with his compensation compared to that
of equity partners with whom he works:
PARTNER: I’m losing my enthusiasm because I feel like I’m be-
ing taken advantage of.
INTERVIEWER: Taken advantage of in what way?
PARTNER: You are paid a lot less as a nonequity partner than an
equity partner, that’s the way. As much as I like a lot of my col-
leagues and as much as I very much appreciate how a couple of
them have played a large role in making me who I am today,
nonetheless this isn’t a charity and I work very hard and I work as
hard as many others who get paid a lot more than I do.113
For this partner, the relevant input is how hard someone works; his
unhappiness with compensation rests on the belief that people who work no
harder than he receive significantly more financial reward.
Research suggests that for purposes of assessing their satisfaction with
compensation, most people tend to rely on an “egocentric bias” in identify-
ing a comparison other.114 This maximizes the amount that they believe
they deserve, “thus leading to a perpetual tendency for pay dissatisfaction
for most individuals.”115 This sense of dissatisfaction may seem dispropor-
tionate in light of the absolute amount of any discrepancy that may exist. Its
intensity, however, rests on one’s sense that justice has not been done be-
cause one has not been treated fairly.
111. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 4.
112. See generally Chen, Choi & Chi, supra note 15, at 807–08 (examining perceptions of
compensation equity in international joint ventures); Lee & Martin, supra note 105 (perceptions of
equity in two-tier wage structures); Kulik & Ambrose, supra note 104 (choice of comparative
referents in organizations).
113. Interview 98, supra note 1, at 5.
114. Chen, Choi & Chi, supra note 15, at 807–08; see also GERHART & RYNES, supra note 79,
at 61.
115. GERHART & RYNES, supra note 79, at 61.
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A partner might also use a lateral partner entering the firm as a stan-
dard for assessing his own compensation. Firms generally notify partners
about the compensation arrangements that the firm has made with a new
lateral partner. A partner may regard this lateral’s inputs as comparable to
her own, based on metrics such as revenue generation, expertise or reputa-
tion, area of practice, or other such factors.  If she uses the lateral as her
comparison other, she will regard that person’s compensation package as
the market’s objective indication of the value of her own inputs. She will be
dissatisfied if there is a gap between that amount and the amount that the
lateral receives. One partner notes:
One of the things that I have become attuned to, and it has been
an area of friction in compensation and in the firm in general, is
what I call the “Everyone loves a lateral” phenomenon, where the
lateral market takes over and you have laterals come over. And
[when] you impose them into the comp structure, they are getting
paid at levels well above what they could command if they were
home grown. There is natural friction . . . and what comes out is
the idea that I may be better off on the open market than I am at
my own firm.116
A partner’s sense of unfairness may be intensified by his conviction
that he has made important contributions to the firm over the years that the
incoming partner has not. One partner expresses this sentiment:
They are probably right that it is important to bring in that new
group where we’re lacking so that we will have a more complete
package, so that we can cross-fertilize better, so that we can sell
our complete firm and all of our capabilities together, but when
you do that then you are bringing in people and sometimes people
at very high compensation levels. As a result of doing that then
you are diluting the value of the shares of other people who have
been here for a while and been sort of dedicated to the firm for a
while.117
This phenomenon appears to have occurred, for instance, within the
Dewey & LeBoeuf law firm, which collapsed in the first part of 2012. Man-
agement at the firm offered generous compensation packages, which in-
cluded guarantees of a specific level of compensation for a certain number
of years, to lure partners from other firms. Information about these pack-
ages was not widely circulated within the firm.
When some partners already at the firm learned of the packages, they
regarded it as unfair that incoming laterals were receiving compensation
guarantees and they were not. This dissatisfaction rested on these partners’
use of the laterals as a benchmark for evaluating their own compensation.
Current partners who believed that their inputs were comparable to those of
116. Interview 23 at 9–10, 12 (Aug. 13, 2012).
117. Interview 72, supra note 23, at 11.
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the laterals could maintain that the compensation that the firm was provid-
ing to the latter served as an objective standard of the value of their own
inputs—and therefore what their own compensation should be. Current
partners could reasonably conclude that the market was apparently willing
to pay this amount and provide these guarantees. If Dewey & LeBoeuf
would not, current partners would go to a firm that would. Firm manage-
ment responded by increasing current partner compensation. By the time of
the firm’s collapse, one hundred partners—a third of the entire partner-
ship—had these guarantees.118
A partner might also use as a compensation benchmark people in other
firms whom they think make a similar contribution to their firms, such as
people in the same practice area or who work with similar types of clients.
Professionals are especially likely to use people outside their organization
as peers.119 Information about those people is often less available than in-
formation about people inside the organization. For law firm partners, how-
ever, there is considerable information about what partners at other firms
make. The legal press is one source of such information, but search firms,
or “headhunters,” play probably the most significant role in furnishing in-
formation about compensation in other firms.
Headhunters work on behalf of firms seeking to lure lawyers and on
behalf of lawyers seeking opportunities in other firms. Partners regularly
receive calls from headhunters advising them that a certain firm is inter-
ested in building up its practice in the partner’s area of expertise. If the
conversation proceeds past a perfunctory point, the partner will learn what
kind of compensation the firm in question is willing to offer if he will join
it. Even a partner not actively seeking opportunities at other firms is likely
to receive enough information through calls from headhunters in the course
of his daily practice to have an idea of what other firms are prepared to pay
him if he were to go on the market. A partner who is interested simply in
“testing the water” can contact a search firm and let it know that he’s open
to discussions with other firms. He may not be actively seeking to leave his
own firm, but this exercise can provide him with an indication of what the
market currently regards as fair compensation for what he has to offer. In
these ways, a partner can select a comparison other at another firm that
guides his assessment of his current compensation.
Most firms identify the factors that will be considered in determining
compensation, and many provide extensive information about all partners’
originations, hours billed, realization, and other factors taken into account
in determining contributions to the firm. The availability of this information
increases the likelihood that an individual will look to a fellow partner with
similar inputs as her comparison other. If a firm also bases compensation
118. Julie Triedman, House of Cards, Part III: A Perfect Storm, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 2012.
119. Kulik & Ambrose, supra note 104, at 224–25.
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strictly according to a formula in which various forms of contribution are
given explicit weight, a partner will find it relatively easy to identify a col-
league who can serve as the basis for comparison. In this type of compensa-
tion system, the extent to which a partner feels that the firm affords him
respect depends on the extent to which it treats him the same as everyone
else with the same measurable forms of contribution. The firm, in other
words, expresses respect by conforming to the standard of formal equality.
A formula-driven firm also expresses respect by making compensation
relatively predictable. A partner will ideally be able to calculate his com-
pensation by relying on the same metrics that the firm uses. If the two num-
bers match, he feels respected because the firm has made a decision
affecting him on the basis of publicly announced criteria. One partner de-
scribes how his firm’s reliance on relatively objective factors led him to
accept its determination of his compensation as fair:
I guess I’ve always been on the verge of wanting to grumble
about the compensation here, but whenever I’ve kind of objec-
tively assessed it and kind of looked at the kind of objective crite-
ria that I know that they use, you know, how much money I
brought in and originated, etc., I’ve always found in the end my
compensation was about where it should be. So I kind of grudg-
ingly think the system actually has been pretty fair and it has
worked.120
The concern with a strict, formula-based system that specifies the
weight that each factor receives, however, is that it may not encourage “or-
ganizational citizenship”—behavior benefitting the firm that goes beyond
what earns a financial reward.121 For example, someone may share origina-
tion credits, but only the minimum necessary to avoid being penalized in his
compensation for failing to do so. The motivation for sharing in this case is
extrinsic (based on the desire to obtain a reward) rather than intrinsic (based
on the belief that sharing is worthwhile beyond the immediate individual
reward that it brings). Being more generous could help strengthen ties
among the partners and promote cooperation that benefits the firm. Because
there is no immediate payoff for acting that way, however, it does not regu-
larly happen. One partner describes an experience with a major rainmaker
in his firm:
There is a partner in one particular group who is good friends
with the general counsel of a huge company. That huge company
has particular needs for [a service that we provide] and we just
120. Interview 94, supra note 96, at 5.
121. On the concept of organizational citizenship behavior, see generally Peggy A. Cloninger
et al., The Influence of Equity, Equality, and Gender on Organizational Citizenship Behaviors,
SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 37 (Autumn 2011); Mark C. Bolino et al., Citizenship Behavior and
the Creation of Social Capital in Organizations, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 505 (2002); Deckop et al.,
supra note 80, at 420.
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wanted to go and meet them, and he said, ‘Fine,’ and it just never
happened. Months went by and it just never happened because it
wasn’t important to him. It was important to us, it was really im-
portant to the firm, but it wasn’t important to him.122
Another drawback of formula-based systems is that they may create
rigidity and resistance to change that prevents a firm from modifying its
compensation system in order to align it more closely with changing needs
and interests of the firm.
Most firms, therefore, do not specify in detail how the compensation
committee has weighed factors relating to contributions in a particular case.
As we have described, many also give the compensation committee some
discretion to include a subjective assessment of a partner’s contribution in
order to encourage and to reward organizational citizenship. This discretion
reflects the view that it is impossible to specify in advance all the ways that
someone may contribute to the success of the firm, and that the firm needs
to be able to take into account individual circumstances that affect perform-
ance. Permitting some reliance on subjective assessments theoretically pro-
vides the opportunity for a firm to pay respect to a partner as a unique
individual by valuing the particular ways in which he contributes to the firm
and by acknowledging any difficulties that he has encountered in doing so.
One partner contrasts his firm’s compensation system with a rigid,
formula-based approach that he calls “eat what you kill”:
Eat what you kill is at the end of the year you hit the print button
on the computer and it generates all the numbers, and whatever
the numbers say goes to compensation—there would be no point
for management. We spend three months [reviewing data] until
we announce bonuses and base compensation.  Why do we do
that? Because it’s not eat what you kill; it’s qualitative merit con-
tribution based. We go through every single partner and we say,
“Okay the numbers suggest this, is there anything else we need to
know?”123
To be sure though, there are shortcomings to a compensation that em-
ploys more subjectivity. To the extent that a firm departs from a pure
formula-based compensation system, a partner’s selection of a comparison
other will not occur on the basis of an indisputably objective standard of
comparison. This leaves room for the operation of an egocentric bias in
identifying a colleague who will serve as a comparison other.
One basis for selecting a peer for comparative purposes in a more sub-
jective compensation system is to choose a colleague who has similar met-
rics to which everyone knows the firm gives significant weight.  The greater
the difference in compensation, despite the same objective metrics, the
122. Interview 21, supra note 56, at 5–6.
123. Interview 83 at 9 (May 30, 2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 43 14-NOV-13 12:16
116 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1
greater the likelihood that a partner will interpret compensation as a judg-
ment about her personal value in the firm.
Those who receive more compensation than others with comparable
objective metrics are likely to feel that the firm respects them by not basing
their compensation solely on “the numbers.” This can be taken as a signal
that the firm is not concerned simply with short-term financial reward and
the behaviors that produce it. Rather, the firm recognizes that people con-
tribute to its success through cooperative behavior not easily measured, and
sometimes through sacrifice of immediate personal interests. For instance, a
partner may agree to refrain from representing a client on a certain matter to
avoid a conflict that would otherwise require the firm to forgo representing
a new, potentially valuable, client. This would reduce the compensation to
which she is entitled unless the firm treats this behavior as a form of contri-
bution to the firm that should be taken into account in setting her
compensation.
In addition, if compensation also reflects appreciation for pro bono
work or the quality of work for a client that is not hugely profitable, it also
can be construed as affirming intrinsically important professional values
apart from their contribution to financial success. As one young partner puts
it:
Law firm practice shouldn’t be about squeezing out every last
penny that you can possibly earn. There is something to be said
for liking your partners, liking what you are doing, and there is a
real value here. And I think that that value [is] pretty substantial,
and if we’re all just looking to maximize the dollar, that existence
doesn’t sound very good. And if we were doing that we have
chosen the wrong profession.124
One income partner also suggests that firms might do more to reward
those who have been loyal to it:
[T]here is something to be said about people who are home grown
and who have institutional knowledge and who know the people
here and who actually do have a certain affinity for the firm, as
opposed to someone who is coming in just for the paycheck. So I
think that provides some value and it doesn’t take very much to
keep those guys happy. . . . If you throw just a small amount like
$50,000 here, $30,000 here, I think people would be very happy
in this economy and stay and try to do what they need to do. It’s
not like we’re asking for millions. And what that means is that
someone who is making $5 million will only make $4.99 [mil-
lion]. . . . [I]t doesn’t take a lot to make people happy.125
124. Interview 23, supra note 116, at 8.
125. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 20.
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The firm also has an opportunity to affirm the importance of consider-
ations beyond objective financial metrics by penalizing partners who violate
norms of collegiality and acceptable behavior.
We see all the numbers. And then we’ll say, “Well, this suggests
this lady should make $600,000,” and then the practice group lead
will say, “Oh, no she should not because”—and I’ve seen this
happen—“this individual has been so rude to her secretary and we
need to send a message, so this individual knows that on the num-
bers she should get $600,000, but let’s pay her $525,000.”
As soon as she sees her compensation number, she’ll insist
on a meeting, and we’re prepared for the meeting. And we say,
“We mean business. We don’t yell at this law firm, we don’t de-
mean, and we don’t belittle. It’s not our culture.”  Now, some
laterals are not accustomed to that, so we have to help them un-
derstand that we mean business. You know I’ve got two partners
right now on my radar who are not going to like what I tell them.
One of them has a difficulty with his temper and the other one has
gone through some very difficult personal things and emotes
those problems in the work place. This is not where you do
that.126
A system with a subjective component can thus create the expectation
that a firm will value some things more than the numbers, such as organiza-
tional citizenship or the quality of a partner’s work. When this expectation
is met, it can provide a partner with the sense that he is valued because he
makes a broad range of contributions to the firm. When this expectation is
not met, however, it can result in disillusionment and the perception that
compensation is really just about narrow financial metrics.
One occasion that may cause disillusionment is when someone who
does a lot of citizenship work receives no more compensation as someone
who has the same financial metrics but does not do such work. This can
create a sense of being personally disrespected because of the firm’s failure
to give subjective factors more weight. It also can lead a partner to conclude
that the firm’s compensation system is really a formula-based system, de-
spite the formal discretion to make subjective judgments.
The tension in many firms is that management may believe that busi-
ness pressures limit its ability to give significant weight to factors that are
not directly related to profitability. One compensation committee partner,
for instance, describes some partners’ belief that the intellectual quality of
their work should be a major factor in determining compensation:
I’ve had a discussion with one of my partners . . . who always
says we should reward people on how smart they are, and I say,
“You know what, here’s the problem: the clients vote on that.
And you may be really smart, but if people aren’t hiring you,
126. Interview 83, supra note 123, at 7.
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that’s an issue. And you may think you’re smarter than this guy
next door, but clients love him and they keep hiring him.”127
At the same time, this partner says that the firm tries to reinforce cul-
tural values through its compensation system by making sure that “there are
a few people who get credit for just being good citizens, helping other peo-
ple out, and being involved in community, and then, as I mentioned, there
are certain people [whom] we tell your elbows are too sharp.”128  He recog-
nizes, however, that “everybody thinks that, ‘Oh you tell me that commu-
nity service is important, pro bono is important, but all you really care about
is . . . collections.’”129
A firm that provides room in the compensation process for subjective
assessments may thus find that the discretion it offers can be a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it can enhance partners’ sense of being
personally respected. On the other, it can increase the risk that people will
construe relatively low compensation as an indication of personal disre-
spect.  Providing discretion to make subjective judgments also creates the
risk that people will regard the compensation process as unpredictable and
opaque rather than transparent. This creates concern about favoritism, espe-
cially toward management and its friends. As the next section discusses,
that can cause dissatisfaction not only with outcomes, but also with the
process by which they are generated.
2. Procedural Justice
Belief in fair process can enhance satisfaction with compensation,
even if someone is not completely happy with how much they receive. Con-
cerns about the unpredictability and opacity of compensation thus can be
worrisome. As two scholars suggest, an organization that satisfies the re-
quirements of procedural justice in dealing with its members
Encourage[s] group members’ engagement in their group even in
the face of receiving outcomes from the group that are less than
they desire.  Since group resources are finite, their distribution
involves the operation of a zero-sum game.  Typically, not every-
one can receive all the resources from the group that they desire.
Nor can all group members depend on receiving all the resources
that they may think they deserve, since distributive justice percep-
tions are often biased in self-serving ways. . . . Procedural jus-
tice . . . provides an alternative means of retaining involvement in
127. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 5.
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id. at 7–8.
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the group . . . since the allocation of fairness in procedural actions
need not be finite or limited.130
By contrast, partners’ sense that their compensation is predictable be-
cause it is based on factors known to everyone contributes to a sense that
the process is fair:
INTERVIEWER: Would you say that overall people trust the
compensation committee to get it right?
PARTNER: I can only speak for myself on that but I do. . . . Each
time I go into [the compensation] process thinking I’m getting
ready to get mad, and then when I analyze it I realize, ‘Well, I
think actually it’s about where it should be.’  To give you an ex-
ample, every two years your share allocation gets readjusted, and
theoretically it can go up or down. And it wasn’t the last one but
the one before [when] I asked for a pretty substantial increase,
and I did it based on my calculation of the amount of revenue,
overhead, and all the rest of it. I said, ‘This is how much I think I
should get,’ and that is what I got . . . . That’s gone a long way in
terms of building my confidence in the system . . . given my un-
derstanding of how the system is supposed to work, I got what I
was supposed to get.131
Another important component of a fair process is an opportunity to be
heard.  One partner notes:
Each partner has an opportunity to write a memo . . .  about who
has been helpful, who has been maybe difficult for you. What are
you doing in the community? What are your pro bono activities?
Tell us all of that or tell us if you’ve had a serious illness in the
family, because that is something we take into account too.  Has
somebody had a tough year because, you know, kid’s been sick,
wife’s been sick, husband’s been sick. We take that into account
and normally that would mean that there is unlikely to be any
movement in their comp even if there was a bad year.132
Another partner comments on the importance of giving colleagues an
opportunity to tell their story:
Every year at the end of the year we do compensation review.
Now I’m talking about partners who are making a million dollars
a year, they are making a lot of money okay, but we don’t know
their full story. Our partners making a million dollars a year may
be supporting his mother-in-law, his cousin, her best friend,
whatever, and so in compensation for example I will sit down and
talk to partners about what their hopes and expectations are and
130. Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Autonomous vs. Comparative Status: Must We Be
Better than Others to Feel Good About Ourselves?, 89 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 813, 816–17 (2002).
131. Interview 94, supra note 96, at 6.
132. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 6.
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how it’s relevant to their life, rather than just imposing their com-
pensation on them.133
Still another important practice that contributes to the perception of a
fair process is candid communication about expectations:
There is inherent feedback in our partner compensation system.
We interview everybody, we tell them why we’ve placed them
where we have and there is some criticism as to what you can do
better and so forth, which isn’t always delivered as well as it
might be. But that’s really important to have people thinking that
they need to improve and understanding what their strengths and
limitations are and so forth and it’s critical for the younger law-
yers to advance, to really be honest with them as to what they
have to do better and what they don’t.134
A firm may also provide an opportunity for a partner to appeal the
decision of the compensation committee if that decision results in a change
in compensation below a certain amount. One partner notes that his firm
permits an appeal if “you are going down a [certain number of points] or if
you haven’t had any movement in a few years.”135
Some partners express frustration that the partner compensation pro-
cess doesn’t make clear how compensation has been determined in any
given instance. As one partner puts it:
[T]he factors that are in compensation are sort of enumerated
now, and many of them are amorphous factors, but you don’t re-
ally know how they are applied. There is really no sense of how
they are applied. It’s basically just in the mind of the beholder.
And you don’t really have any sense of how it’s applied.136
As another partner articulates, this can give rise to suspicion that com-
pensation reflects partiality or favoritism rather than the consistent applica-
tion of uniform standards:
PARTNER: But here I think the problem is . . . that we’re not
really sure how our compensation is driven, other than the fact
that I think it’s based on the decisions made by management be-
cause you have certain people getting the big numbers, you know,
given big compensation when they don’t necessary [sic] have the
big numbers, when they don’t have the big clients and they don’t
have the relationships, but maybe they have the right title or they
have the right relationship to certain people in management and
whatever else . . . .
INTERVIEWER: So there’s a big element of subjectivity?
PARTNER: Yes.
133. Interview 83, supra note 123, at 2.
134. Interview 59 at 19–20 (Mar. 6, 2012).
135. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 2.
136. Interview 72, supra note 23, at 7.
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INTERVIEWER: Which then leads some people to suspect that
maybe it’s partly whom you know as much as what you do?
PARTNER: Yep.137
A partner’s sense of respect also can be affected by his comparison
with others whom the partner knows generate more revenue, and thus are
not peers. The focus here is on the “spread”—the difference between the
highest- and lowest-paid partners. A partner’s belief that the spread is too
high can reflect the view that the highest-paid partners deploy important
business skills, but that these skills should not be given so much greater
weight than contributions based on factors such as the quality of one’s
work, collaboration with colleagues, and keeping clients happy.
Business skills may consist of networking and salesmanship, or in
some cases may involve management of the firm without involvement in
practice. In either case, they represent capabilities that some partners regard
as something other than core professional legal skills. Some dissatisfaction
with the spread thus reflects concern that the firm is simply a business with-
out a distinctive professional identity.
A partner in one firm expresses this sense of dissatisfaction when dis-
cussing the compensation of law firm partners who devote their time to
management rather than law practice:
In my mind, the question becomes, ‘Should management reside in
fairly highly compensated partners whose principal effort is man-
agement, as opposed to the practice of law, or could it reside part-
time in those people where they would also be practicing law, or
could it be placed in the hands of nonlawyers who may be very
good at management, [who] wouldn’t necessarily need to be com-
pensated at the same level. So management compensates itself
very well . . . the management layer has gotten much thicker and
the compensation at that level is really quite high.138
Another partner expresses a similar concern:
[Partners in management] are working pretty close to full-time on
this; it’s not like part-time sitting in a meeting now and then.
They are really, day in and day out, working on these issues. But
that said, they are not really generating revenue for the firm, and
when you have a structure that really is so heavily focused on
what you are bringing in in terms of your revenue, it does kind of
irk a little bit to see somebody making far in excess of me and the
amount of money they bring [sic] into the firm is like a fraction of
what I bring.139
Based on earlier comments from his interview, this partner believes
that he receives fair compensation for his contributions. He wonders, how-
137. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 12.
138. Interview 72, supra note 23, at 3.
139. Interview 94, supra note 96, at 5.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 49 14-NOV-13 12:16
122 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1
ever, if members of management receive more than their fair share. Any
dissatisfaction therefore is not with his own compensation compared to
those he considers his peers. Instead, it arises when he compares himself
with how much others receive who are not using legal skills to serve clients.
3. Respect and Promotion
Finally, a firm can send signals about respect through the extent to
which it keeps income partners apprised of their individual prospects for
advancement to equity partner. Such advancement is of course an important
dimension of the compensation process, because it changes the basis for
compensation from salary to entitlement to a share of the firm’s profits. For
income partners, however, promotion also sends a signal about respect.
Consider one partner’s description of why he would not want to be an in-
come partner indefinitely:
PARTNER: I wouldn’t [be interested in that] because partnership
means something to me; it’s beyond just the money. We join this
profession, we went into law, at least I did, not to maximize every
dollar that you get, but because we like the intellectual rigor of
what we do, we do like the lifestyle it affords us in terms of being
able to do certain things. Certainly I grew up middle class so I do
things today that I thought that movie stars did. I know that
sounds silly, but when you get together with a group of people, it
has to be more meaningful than just trying to squeeze the pennies
out today. If you are good at doing what you do and work as hard
as we work, to make it palatable there have to be human relation-
ships and interactions. Otherwise it’s just miserable.
INTERVIEWER: And you don’t feel a part of that partnership as
an income partner?
PARTNER: Oh, you do . . . but there [are] certainly first class and
second class citizens. I mean that’s the point of it . . . . Some are
not equals. Certain partners have more at stake and have more of
a voice, and as I continue on my career I want to continue on that
trajectory and have a voice and be able to be on par with my
partners, so that we can talk about the challenges that face us and
choose a path to steer.140
A firm providing guidance on how to proceed in order to obtain a
promotion to equity partner therefore can signal respect for an income part-
ner, while a failure to do so leaves a partner with a sense that his or her
career is at a dead end. One income partner expresses it this way:
It’s completely depressing, to be honest. I mean, especially for
someone like me and some of my peers who worked crazy hours
to finally make partner, get over the hump and realize oh this is
what I worked hard for . . . . For associates, it’s a regulated envi-
140. Interview 23, supra note 116, at 11–12.
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ronment and there is a recruiting market out there and you have
Above the Law, so there is actually a mechanism for them to ex-
press their discontent and have it be heard in a certain way . . . .
For income partners there is nothing, there is nothing like that.
It’s a real free market, and no law firm at this point in time wants
a special partner who doesn’t have a book of business. And you
know, you try to go in-house. Well, there aren’t that many posi-
tions open. So I think for a lot of people it’s kind of like, you
know, keep your head down, smile when you have to, just try to
survive as long as you can until something better comes along.141
Another income partner suggests how firms might address this sense
of demoralization:
I would like to think, especially in the early years of partnership,
there would be a formal process, and not just the good graces of
the people who have always looked out for you, whereby firm
management—the same people who will decide how much you
get paid and if and when you are elevated to equity—would sit
down and say where are we, what are you trying to do, how are
you doing and how can the firm help. I’ve heard those things said,
but there is no process whereby that is done. That would help
make nonequity partners feel like at least they are still watching,
they are still paying attention, and I feel like there is a path.142
This partner goes on to emphasize the importance of specific guidance:
[I]t would also be useful to say look you know to be considered
for equity we’re looking for X, Y and Z and you are currently at
half X and two-thirds Y and Z you’re not really started on yet but
next year maybe, again to have a sense that you are not just a
worker bee but you’re someone about whom there are significant
future expectations. My sense is that junior equity partners feel
similarly—how do I know how these decisions are getting made,
and where is that sense of connection? It’s really a matter of sim-
ply making [people] feel like they have a future and giving them
evidence of it, which ties into the sense of being respected and
cared for.143
Another partner who is involved in compensation decisions acknowl-
edges the potential for service partners to feel that their lack of many oppor-
tunities elsewhere makes them vulnerable to being short-changed in
compensation compared to rainmakers:
You try to explain why you do what you do, and that you know
the market is what the market is, and indeed most of them, al-
though they don’t like it, are very smart people. They get that if
they were to walk out the door tomorrow they are more valuable
141. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 16–17.
142. Interview 98, supra note 1, at 17.
143. Id.
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to us and better compensated here than they would be anywhere
else. Now I don’t throw that in their face, I don’t think that’s
constructive, but it’s the facts and it’s a sad fact. This economy
and the constant struggle to keep people from being poached have
required that more of the compensation dollars go to the produc-
ers, away from the service people. That has happened over the
last five or six years, and it’s become more acute in the last three.
That does present morale challenges—no question about it, no
question about it.144
One firm in our study attempts to address concerns about limited op-
portunity for income partner advancement by using compensation to pro-
vide temporary financial rewards to balance the inability to achieve a
promotion. One income partner describes the process:
I do know that with folks who are not making the next step to
equity, and are being told the second year in a row [that] they are
not making it, the firm is using compensation mechanisms to
make somebody who gets basically turned down from the equity
ranks . . . feel whole. The idea is to try to give them a compensa-
tion level that is equivalent to a first-year equity partner. . . .
You’ve got fourth-, fifth-, sixth-year nonequity partners who are
doing very well, developing a nice profile, and [the firm has] got
to find a way to keep them happy, even if they don’t have room
for them in the equity ranks.145
Rainmakers and service partners thus exemplify differing ways in
which lawyers can be valued. The former represent the emergent business
and marketing orientation that has become a necessity in law firms. The
importance of these skills is reflected in giving greater weight to origination
credit in the compensation process. Service partners exemplify the values
involved in the traditional professional ideal of doing good work, which
these partners sometimes feel is not given enough respect. Service partners
can be especially sensitive to the lesser value placed on their contributions
than those of rainmakers:
[R]ainmakers bring[ ] in the clients in the first place to the firm.
Then there are others who service those clients. There are [still]
others who expand the business of those clients by doing work
that the rainmaker or others could not necessarily do. So that is
developing business. However, that is not valued nearly as much
as the rainmakers. So there are different areas in terms of com-
pensation for rainmaking [and] servicing clients, [these reflect]
just your relative importance in the firm.146
A firm that recognizes the role of compensation in the firm’s moral
economy—not simply its material economy—will be sensitive to its part-
144. Interview 10, supra note 50, at 15.
145. Interview 103, supra note 36, at 14–15.
146. Interview 72, supra note 23, at 3.
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ners’ need for the firm to affirm their value as lawyers. To the extent that
partners do feel respected, they may develop intrinsic motivation to act for
the benefit of the firm, rather than being motivated by the desire for a re-
ward. Such motivation can provide a sense of connection to the firm that is
based on a deeper foundation than financial self-interest.
As the next section describes, even if law firm management appreci-
ates that its compensation system is part of a moral economy that sends
important messages about respect, it faces a potentially formidable obstacle
in ensuring that partners feel respected. The factors on which a firm relies in
determining compensation are often subject to the bargaining among part-
ners over origination credits. The operation of this market can strongly af-
fect partners’ sense of the extent to which they are valued, because
decisions about whether and how much to share credit are made by col-
leagues with whom a partner directly works. Firms attempt, to varying de-
grees, to encourage partners to share credits in this market. The ability of
rainmakers to go elsewhere, however, imposes a practical limit on how
much many firms can do.
D. The Internal Market of the Firm
The most psychologically salient outcomes in most firms’ internal
markets are those that involve origination credits. A partner’s skill set and
need for billable work influence his bargaining power with respect to ob-
taining such credits. While firms make some effort to prevent egregiously
unfair outcomes in this market, many partners regard it as largely unregu-
lated. As a result, outcomes tend to reflect the personalities of individual
partners and the dynamics of ad hoc negotiation.
The internal market is shaped by the fact that rainmaking partners who
have relationships with clients begin with presumptive entitlement to origi-
nation credit for any matter involving their clients. As one partner describes
it:
Yeah, the person who originates will get credit for anything . . . . I
mean this is general, it doesn’t always hold the case, but that’s
generally the case. However, if for example there is a big matter
which is the first matter that is brought in by partner number one
and partner number two does most of the work on it, if because of
the excellent work on matter number one there are five other mat-
ters that partner number two may not have been involved in, but
was really instrumental in securing the client for the firm, the
partner may not get any originations for any of those other mat-
ters . . . . So therefore compensation is largely driven by
originations.147
147. Id. at 7.
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A partner’s satisfaction with the allocation of origination credits de-
pends on the same considerations as those that affect his satisfaction with
the firm’s decision about his compensation. First, does a partner believe that
another partner has given him the credits he deserves in light of his contri-
bution on a matter? Second, does a partner believe that another partner has
relied on a fair process to determine whether to share credits or how many
to share? Finally, what has another partner’s decision about origination
credits communicated about the respect that he has for the partner with
whom he has worked? As with the firm’s decisions about partners’ compen-
sation, outcomes in the origination market are therefore part of a complex
moral economy that distributes both money and meaning.
The allocation of respect in this sector of the moral economy can have
an especially powerful impact because it occurs through the personal inter-
action of partners. The sense of respect that is allocated in these interactions
can be even more vivid and personally significant than the form of respect
conveyed by the firm in its compensation decision. A partner interacts with
a firm about his compensation once a year for a limited period of time. The
conversation of course focuses on his particular compensation, but part of it
may well touch on general factors affecting his compensation for which he
is not responsible, such as the firm’s business strategy, general economic
conditions, and the amount of demand in the partner’s practice area. A
firm’s determination of compensation is thus likely to be based at least in
part on considerations that don’t reflect personally on him. In addition, it
reflects a judgment by “the firm,” which may be an abstract actor to a part-
ner in a large firm notwithstanding the personal importance of the compen-
sation decision.
By contrast, decisions about the division of origination credits allocate
respect through direct personal interactions between individual partners.
They reflect a particular colleague’s judgment about the value of another
partner’s contributions. This judgment is more intensely personal than a
firm’s determination of a partner’s compensation. The respect or disrespect
it communicates therefore can be especially meaningful. One service part-
ner elaborates on this point:
[There are cases where] I am confident that I’ve been a part of
helping us land some of our largest corporate work, confident.
But when it comes time to reward people, it’s the corporate guy
who landed the deal who gets all the gravy. What we do often
isn’t even given its own matter in the sense that we might be
given some of the credit for that piece of the deal. It’s just you are
expected to contribute, but frankly it just means I’m billing my
hours so at that point I might as well be a second year
associate.148
148. Interview 98, supra note 1, at 7.
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Another service partner describes the conflict that can arise over shar-
ing origination credits:
[There was an] individual who left a year ago who did not treat it
fairly, and people got very upset. An existing client of someone
else’s would be brought in and he would want to take the full
origination credit or one of his clients would have a new matter
that actually was the kind of work he didn’t do and so he would
bring in someone else to do the work but he wanted to keep all
the origination credit. Those are the kind of things people remem-
ber and then that does increase resentment.149
These psychological dynamics of the firm’s internal market influence a
partner’s satisfaction with the outcomes of that market. With respect to
judgments about distributive justice, a partner’s conclusions about whether
he has received what he deserves will be sensitive to whether he believes
his contributions have been appropriately recognized in the internal market.
That market tends to give substantial weight to the development of personal
relationships with clients as a measure of contributions.
By contrast, a service partner’s definition of his contribution may fo-
cus on the quality of his legal work. The latter, however, may not represent
currency in the market for origination credits. This can trigger a sense of
unfairness. Even more disconcerting, a service partner may believe that he
makes a contribution by interacting with and being responsive to a client far
more regularly than the partner who brought the client to the firm. The
failure of the latter partner to acknowledge this by sharing origination cred-
its may provoke an especially acute sense that a partner is not receiving
what he deserves.
Any belief that outcomes are unfair may be accentuated by a sense of
unfair process. A service partner’s receipt of origination credits depends on
the generosity of a rainmaker and whatever bargain the service partner is
able to strike. In most cases, in other words, the process is a function of
informal personal interaction rather than the uniform application of any
general rules. This means that most partners are unlikely to regard the inter-
nal market as operating on the principle of fair process.
In the market for origination credits, beliefs about distributive justice
therefore are unlikely to be tempered by a sense of procedural justice. A
compensation committee member may have some credibility in saying to a
service partner, “It’s nothing personal,” but a rainmaker in the internal mar-
ket generally does not. The fact that outcomes in the market for origination
credit are driven by what are perceived as highly personal judgments makes
it more likely that a service partner will be highly skeptical about the fair-
ness of the process that produces those outcomes. As one service partner
put it, “I think that because of the way the compensation is structured, it just
149. Interview 6, supra note 75, at 37.
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makes sense for you to keep all the originations and really try to monopo-
lize the client relationship so that the younger guy can’t be a threat to
you.”150
The allocation of personal respect in the internal market is shaped in
important ways by the fact that interactions occur in a setting in which
service partners generally are dependent on the good graces of rainmakers.
This inequality is based not on the quality of the legal work that partners do,
but on the extent to which they have close relationships with clients. Those
who do not have many such relationships are dependent for work on those
who do.
All partners are members of a profession with traditional aspirations to
individual independence and control over one’s practice. Rainmakers, how-
ever, come much closer to realizing these aspirations than do service part-
ners. Even though partners ostensibly have equal formal status, the
relationship between a rainmaker and a service partner can effectively ap-
proach that of an employer and an employee. If a service partner is unhappy
with a rainmaker’s decision about origination credits, he may have little
recourse within the firm. Furthermore, threatening to leave the firm may not
be credible because there is relatively low demand in the lateral market for
partners without substantial books of business. In addition, of course, a ser-
vice partner may well feel constrained in asserting any claim because of his
need to obtain a regular flow of work from a rainmaker. One income partner
describes his experience:
I will go to one of my mentors here and I’ll say, “Okay what do I
do now? I really developed this relationship—maybe the partner
originally had a relationship with the general counsel, but let’s
say that general counsel is no longer there and now I am . . . best
friends with the new general counsel, [and I’ve] been doing work
for them.” So the question is, “Shouldn’t I be originating part-
ner?” Sometimes I’ll get the advice, “Don’t bite the hand that
feeds you.” In one case I called the partner who had the relation-
ship and he said it kind of jokingly—but I know he wasn’t—and
he said, “Well, for as long as I’m here I’ll always be billing part-
ner for this client.”151
This dynamic can make interactions between partners in the firm’s in-
ternal market especially fraught with the potential for triggering resentment.
Notwithstanding a service partner’s acknowledgement of his substantive
dependence, he may take offense at any behavior by a rainmaker that under-
scores it and makes it more explicit. As one service partner puts it, “[T]he
partner-associate thing isn’t all that different from the equity partner-in-
150. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 8.
151. Interview 64 at 8 (Aug. 22, 2012).
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come partner thing, and I feel a lot more like a well-paid associate
sometimes.”152
Furthermore, both partners know that the rainmaker is not wholly self-
sufficient. He must rely on service partners to do the work for the clients
that he brings in and to do whatever it takes to keep them happy. There is,
in other words, some degree of mutual dependence between a rainmaker
and service partner, even if one party to the relationship is less dependent
than the other. A service partner may thus resent a rainmaker who hoards
origination credits not simply because it has a financial impact, but also
because a rainmaker is effectively denying the contributions of his col-
league and is asserting a self-sufficiency that they both know is false. A
service partner describes the sense of unfairness that can result from this
denial of mutual dependence:
Our compensation structure is based in part on the idea of origina-
tions and I don’t think enough people play fair . . . . The same guy
who brought client X in 30 years ago is still getting 50 percent of
everything everybody else does, and hey man, if I get 50 percent
from everybody, I would be thrilled . . . . Someone brings the
work in and I do 98 percent of the work with my team of associ-
ates, and I feel like he’s getting compensated and I’m not. He’s
getting overly compensated and I’m getting undercompensated
for the way the work is done because clearly I couldn’t do the
work if he didn’t have the relationship, but the work couldn’t get
done if there weren’t someone like me to do it.”153
A service partner with whom a rainmaker refuses to share origination
credit may regard the refusal as a personal devaluation of his work and his
status within the firm. More broadly, the refusal may communicate that the
service partner is not so much an independent as he is someone whose
work-life is subject to the demands of other more powerful colleagues. This
can be demoralizing and corrosive to any sense of attachment to the firm.
This feeling may also be exacerbated by the feeling that rainmakers “get
away with murder here just because they are viewed as money-makers.” As
one partner observes, these types of partners:
Don’t follow the rules; they all take a case without filing a con-
flicts check. The next thing you know, we’re going to work for a
client and they say, “Oh, no, I’m sorry. We’re already doing
something; that’s a conflict.” If they don’t feel like helping out on
getting more work for the firm because it’s just inconsistent with
their self-interest, they don’t.  There is some of that, and I don’t
know how you resolve it because those are folks who say, “Look,
152. Interview 98, supra note 1, at 5.
153. Id.
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if I don’t get my way, I’m out of here.” I guess you have to be
prepared to say “Okay, good-bye,” but that takes some guts.154
A law firm’s internal market has particular importance because it
serves to allocate respect most directly from a partner’s colleagues. Because
this market occurs through daily personal interactions on “the shop floor,” it
can have an especially powerful impact on the extent to which a partner
feels valued as a lawyer. To some degree, the sum total of these interactions
effectively is the firm on a visceral level for a partner. Their quality is likely
to have significant influence on how the partner views the firm and his
place in it. How generous or self-interested colleagues are in such interac-
tions sends a message about, and continuously serves to shape, the culture
of the firm.
These interactions may lead a partner to conclude that the firm is a
place in which most people are likely to pursue their own interest, and that
he needs to protect himself by doing the same. Or it may lead a partner to
conclude that the firm is a place in which people have some commitment to
shared values and are willing to temper self-interest for the sake of the
larger good. A partner who reaches the latter conclusion is more likely to
feel that he can do the same, trusting that others will not take advantage of
him if he does. That does not mean that considerations of self-interest will
never be salient; there will inevitably be occasions when they are. What it
means is that a partner has enough confidence in his colleagues that he does
not feel the need to relentlessly pursue only personal rewards without re-
gard for others.
The sense of trust that can emerge from interactions in the internal
market can be fragile; trust is more easily destroyed than created. It can,
however, generate a virtuous cycle, in which trust leads to a willingness to
behave generously, which signals to others that it is safe to trust, which in
turn leads them to be generous. As more people trust and behave accord-
ingly, the message can become stronger and more widely communicated.
This process can provide a way to surmount the difficulties of encour-
aging cooperation that are characteristic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the
classic depiction of this situation, two individuals need to decide whether to
cooperate or pursue their own interest. They will be better off if they coop-
erate because that will maximize the total amount of benefits that are avail-
able for them to enjoy. In the absence of the ability to communicate with
each other to arrange cooperation, however, each must worry that the other
will act in her self-interest. The payoffs are such that pursuing self-interest
produces the most rewards, while cooperating when the other person acts in
her self-interest produces the fewest. Each individual therefore will ration-
ally conclude that the safe thing to do is to pursue self-interest, which leads
to a worse outcome for both than if they had cooperated.
154. Interview 21, supra note 56, at 11.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 58 14-NOV-13 12:16
2012] MONEY AND MEANING 131
The critical feature in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the inability of the
individuals to communicate. If each had some signal that the other would
cooperate, each might feel safe to do so as well, which would result in the
largest payoff. In the law firm context, interactions in the internal market
can serve the function of communicating whether it is safe to act for the
good of the firm, or whether it is necessary solely to pursue one’s self-
interest. People will undoubtedly behave in different ways, but a critical
mass of partners who are willing to temper self-interest can be enough to
elicit at least some measure of trust that potentially can be self-multiplying
in the way described above.
What would it mean for rainmakers and service partners to act more
generously in the firm’s internal market, and what would be their motiva-
tion for doing so? Acting more generously for rainmakers is relatively
straightforward: a willingness to share origination credits. But why would
they be interested in helping create a more cooperative firm culture to
which members would have some allegiance? First, most narrowly, this
type of culture might increase the origination credits that a partner receives
from fellow rainmakers. Many rainmakers are not just Finders. To differing
degrees they also are Minders who do work for other rainmakers’ clients.
An ethos of sharing origination credits could enhance the compensation that
they receive from playing the latter role.
More broadly, even if a rainmaker’s concern is mainly obtaining finan-
cial rewards, a firm in which people are committed and engaged is also one
that is more productive. People who don’t feel respected and don’t feel that
it’s safe to look beyond their own interest are less willing to share ideas or
to go the extra mile to get the job done. This is especially true in organiza-
tions in the knowledge industry, which compete by generating innovative
solutions for their clients and customers.155 If a firm’s internal market tends
to communicate disrespect for service partners, this may lead to disengage-
ment by partners who are essential to serving clients and keeping them sat-
isfied. There is also some research that suggests that employees in
professional service firms who occupy such positions may be an especially
important source of innovation.156 Enlightened self-interest can therefore
motivate a rainmaker to act in the internal market in a way that allocates
respect to service partners.
Finally, one should not assume that all rainmakers are interested only
in financial rewards. For instance, a rainmaker also generally wants respect
from other rainmakers. There is the potential for a hierarchy even within the
155. W. Chan Kim & Renee Mauborgne, Fair Process: Managing in the Knowledge Econ-
omy, HARV. BUS. REV. 127, Jan. 2003.
156. See generally Michael Smets et al., Orchestrating for a Winning Performance: Re-Think-
ing Strategy in Professional Service Firms, available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/profes
sionalservices/Documents/Smets%20-%20Orchestrating%20for%20a%20winning%20performan
ce.pdf.
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ranks of rainmakers based on the amount of business that a partner gener-
ates. A rainmaker may well want to be well-regarded by fellow rainmakers
not simply for his book of business, but for the quality of his legal work and
the value of the service that he provides to their clients. It may be impor-
tant, in other words, for him to be respected for both business and tradi-
tional professional skills.
Furthermore, many lawyers value the opportunity to be of service to
clients, to work in a collegial atmosphere, to do high-quality work, to par-
ticipate in work that is intrinsically meaningful, and to be of some service to
society. Some also value being part of a firm that has a historical legacy that
exemplifies these values. We are social animals, and being involved with
others in pursuing a common purpose is a powerful source of satisfac-
tion.157 A rainmaker therefore may value cooperation as a good in itself, not
simply as a means to maximize long-term self-interest.158
Firms that are able to inculcate an ethos of generosity in the internal
market may create stronger organizational glue than those that are not. A
rainmaker who sees the value of tempering his pursuit of self-interest with
more generous behavior will have more of a stake in the success of the
entire firm than one who sees the firm simply as a vehicle for accumulating
as many financial rewards as possible. The rainmaker who tempers his self-
interest may also develop at least some amount of intrinsic motivation,
which, as discussed above, is a more powerful force for shaping behavior
than is extrinsic motivation. To the extent this occurs, it can provide a form
of glue that may lead him to decline offers to join other firms that offer
ostensibly higher compensation. It also may create a sense of loyalty to the
firm that leads a partner to help the firm respond to financial challenges
rather than jumping ship as soon as possible.
Service partners generally are not in a position to have origination
credits, and will thus have fewer opportunities to shape the firm’s internal
market through their decisions about sharing such credits. They may have
opportunities, however, to behave generously in the market for work. A
service partner who is convinced that she needs to relentlessly pursue her
self-interest will fiercely compete with her colleagues for work from other
partners, regardless of whether she is the person who could provide the
most value to the client on a particular matter. To the extent that she has
any discretion to select other members of a project team, she may choose
those she sees as less of a threat to her advancement. If she has an opportu-
nity to organize how some of the work is done, she may do so in order to
ensure that she receives the most credit. She may also be disinclined to
157. See generally THERESA M. AMABILE & STEVEN J. KRAMER, THE PROGRESS PRINCIPLE:
USING SMALL WINS TO IGNITE JOY, ENGAGEMENT, AND CREATIVITY AT WORK (2011) (discussing
how managers can foster progress and enhance inner work-life amongst employees).
158. This cooperative mentality is coined the “Assurance Game,” which is a variant of Game
Theory that was first described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
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pitch in to help colleagues whom she regards as rivals, out of a belief that
their gain will be her loss. In each of these instances, she is making deci-
sions that are as self-interested as the hoarding of origination credits, and
may be equally damaging to developing a collegial culture within the firm.
To the extent that a service partner feels that the firm’s internal market
shows her respect, she will be more likely to regard the firm as a place
where she is valued and where she and colleagues are working for a com-
mon purpose. She therefore may be more inclined to make decisions such
as these with a view to the firm’s larger interest rather than simply her own.
Her sense of attachment to the firm also may lead her to engage in acts of
organizational citizenship such as helping mentor junior lawyers and serv-
ing on firm committees. In addition, she may be less likely to follow a
rainmaker who decides to leave the firm, or to depart for some personal
opportunity that arises. To the extent that firms are interested in institution-
alizing clients—making them more clients of the firm than of individual
partners—the Minders and Grinders in the service partner ranks are critical
in ensuring that a client receives the consistently high-quality service that
leads it to turn to the firm to do its legal work.
For all these reasons, a law firm has a substantial interest in ensuring
that partner interactions in its internal market serve to allocate the respect
from colleagues that is so crucial to a partner’s sense of connection to the
firm. As we have discussed, firms attempt in various ways to influence
behavior in the internal market. Each approach that the firm uses may in-
crease compensation, but each may also have a different impact on the allo-
cation of respect.
First, a firm may limit the period during which origination credit is
available or require that eligibility for it is contingent on a partner having
substantial ongoing involvement in a matter. Second, a firm may award
management credits to partners for assuming responsibility for managing
matters for the clients of their colleagues. This practice attempts to reduce
the extent to which compensation reflects partners’ dependence on
rainmakers’ willingness to share origination credits. Management credits
typically do not boost compensation as much as origination credits do. They
can, however, communicate recognition of the importance and value of
high-quality work and client service in addition to the business develop-
ment skills that are reflected in origination credits. By sending this message,
the award of management credits underscores that rainmakers are not self-
sufficient. They must necessarily rely on the contributions of their col-
leagues who possess traditional professional skills to ensure that clients re-
main satisfied and continue to turn to the rainmaker when they have legal
needs. This affirmation of mutual dependence can enhance a service part-
ner’s feeling of being respected as well as his sense of making an integral
contribution to a common mission.
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Third, a firm may establish guidelines for sharing origination credits
that it encourages partners to follow. This represents an effort to establish
norms that can influence partners’ exercise of discretion in the internal mar-
ket. A firm may try to reinforce and signal the importance of such norms by
penalizing failures to abide by them. Our research suggests, however, that
firms tend to do this infrequently, reserving it for especially egregious in-
stances in which rainmakers claim credits that should be shared with others.
One partner describes the delicacy of attempting to adjust the compensation
of rainmakers for being insufficiently generous:
INTERVIEWER: To what extent can the firm use compensation
to try to drive some of the cooperative behavior?
PARTNER: You can, you can. The issue really is this: it’s easy to
give the carrot and say, “I’m going to give you extra money be-
cause you did what we want you to do.” We do that and we make
it known that we do it. What we don’t do enough is use it as a
stick. We don’t say, “Hey, asshole, we don’t like what you’ve
done. You would have made X but you’re going to make X less
something because of the way you acted,” because right now that
asshole probably is producing $5 million of business. He says,
“Okay, [if] you don’t want me, I’ll go and down the street they’ll
pay me double what you’re paying me.” It really does handcuff
from using compensation as much as you like.159
Another partner observes,
[We may say to someone], “Well, I don’t know who you think
you’re kidding but you didn’t produce all this business yourself
. . . . [W]e know you have a team, we know you had a big envi-
ronmental matter you took 80 percent of the credits for that when
you should have only had 50 percent of that. You took advantage
of this poor guy who came over here from X and he’s good
enough not to have complained about you, but you know what,
you’re not helping us and you’re not helping yourself.”160
This partner acknowledges, however, “Now again life isn’t perfect.
You try sending those messages to people who don’t receive them well and
who are very valuable to the firm, and this is where you get into the under-
belly of law firms and lawyers.”161
An additional limitation of adjusting compensation to penalize failures
to share is that firms generally do not publicize the fact when they do it.
The rainmaker will know about it, as will any partners whose compensation
is increased as a result of the adjustment. Other partners, however, likely
will not. This can limit the extent to which the penalty communicates that
the firm takes the sharing guidelines seriously.
159. Interview 10, supra note 50, at 12.
160. Interview 105, supra note 68, at 13.
161. Id. at 14.
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Aside from these pragmatic considerations, enforcing guidelines by
penalizing compensation also may have a limited impact on the allocation
of respect in the internal market. That market operates through interaction
by individual partners. These interactions only communicate respect when
one partner believes that a colleague genuinely values his contributions as a
fellow professional. A partner may receive more compensation when a firm
overrides a rainmaker’s division of credits, but he knows that this has oc-
curred over the objection of the rainmaker. What the rainmaker actually
thinks of him thus presumably remains unchanged. As a result, the increase
in compensation communicates respect from the firm, but not respect from
the rainmaker. Only the rainmaker’s voluntary willingness to share credits
can do that.
One firm in our study attempts to address this limitation of penalties
by distributing information about the extent to which individual partners
share credits. This reflects reliance on partners’ concerns about their reputa-
tion as a means to influence their behavior. The effectiveness of circulating
information about sharing credits will of course depend on the extent to
which a partner has such a concern, and on the willingness of colleagues
informally to express their disapproval to him. A rainmaker who shares
credits because he cares about the opinions of fellow partners can more
effectively communicate respect to another partner than one whose initial
division of credits has been overruled by the firm. One could still claim that
the gesture is not entirely voluntary because it is influenced by the desire to
avoid a reputational penalty. For a partner not privy to a rainmaker’s state
of mind, however, the rainmaker’s gesture is substantially more voluntary
than a forced reassignment of credits by the firm. In addition, partners who
behave based on a desire to avoid reputational damage from violating infor-
mal norms may well eventually internalize those norms. This possibility
enhances the likelihood that the operation of the internal market will be
seen as fairly allocating respect among partners.
A rainmaker’s genuine generosity, of course, is the most powerful sig-
nal of respect. It can serve to downplay another partner’s dependence, ac-
knowledge the rainmaker’s own dependence on his colleagues, affirm the
value of a fellow partner’s contribution, and recognize the quality of a ser-
vice partner’s work. It can communicate that someone who may be a ser-
vice partner is a valued colleague who exercises at least some independence
and has some degree of control over his life as a professional.
Generosity is especially meaningful because it is not required. A firm
has an obligation to compensate a partner in accordance with criteria that it
has established. Doing so can elicit from a partner a sense of attachment to
the firm because the firm has fulfilled its obligation to engage in a fair
exchange with him. This basis for attachment, however, may generate only
extrinsic motivation to benefit the firm in accordance with what the com-
pensation system rewards.
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By contrast, a service partner knows that a rainmaker who shares origi-
nation credit has chosen to do so even though he could have kept them all
for himself. The rainmaker, in other words, has acted fairly not in order to
fulfill an obligation but because he wants to acknowledge the value of the
service partner’s assistance. This can deliver a powerful message to the lat-
ter about his value as a lawyer.
Perhaps the most effective way for firms to influence the internal mar-
ket therefore is for major rainmakers to forgo taking as many credits, and as
much compensation, as they could. Modeling the kind of behavior that the
firm wants to see can have a powerful effect on partners. We regularly have
heard stories of how the willingness of partners with large books of busi-
ness to do this has shaped the culture of the firm. One partner relates the
approach of a colleague who is a major rainmaker in the firm:
[H]e could probably demand five times the compensation he
makes, but what he does, and he does this to create loyalty, is that
he will take less compensation for himself and say, “Compensate
these other people who are really important to my practice well.”
And so that simultaneously binds them to him and keeps them
happy and keeps them here. He’s always made a point of saying
that it’s a point of pride that he leaves money on the table; he
doesn’t extract out of the firm all the money he could and that’s
an example for other people too.162
Lawyers who have benefited from this practice and who themselves
have become major rainmakers tend to feel a strong obligation to follow
this example in dealing with junior lawyers. In this way, a rainmaker’s acts
of generosity can have a powerful ripple effect that shapes the atmosphere
and culture of a firm.
A law firm’s internal market therefore plays a crucial role in the moral
economy of compensation. Because decisions about sharing credit are made
by colleagues with whom a partner works, they can send especially vivid
messages about respect. Those messages of course have intensely personal
significance. In addition, they serve more broadly to communicate to part-
ners the extent to which the firm in which they work is shaped mainly by its
members’ self-interested behavior or by a more expansive sense of common
purpose.
E. Summary
A law firm’s partner compensation system distributes both material
and symbolic goods to its partners. Apart from the financial rewards pro-
vided by the material economy, a firm’s moral economy operates to allocate
respect among its partners. Amounts of and differences in compensation
162. Interview 52, supra note 14, at 15.
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effectively communicate which qualities serve as the bases for being
respected as a valuable member of the firm.
In recent years, intensifying competitive pressures have led firms to
attach more importance to skills commonly associated with operating a suc-
cessful business, and to contributions more readily identified as directly
contributing to profitability. The increasing importance of these business
skills means that a good law firm lawyer is now not simply someone who
does excellent legal work or helps to create a collegial atmosphere within
the firm. The greater importance that firms attach to these more commercial
attributes is reflected in their increasing emphasis in determining partner
compensation. The result is that the compensation process has taken on sig-
nificance as an occasion for considering—and sometimes contesting—the
relative value of those qualities that characterize a good lawyer. As the next
section suggests, compensation can therefore be seen as one arena in which
law firms are attempting to reconcile contemporary business demands with
traditional notions of professionalism.
IV. COMPENSATION AND THE MEANINGS OF PROFESSIONALISM
The trend in law firm compensation systems toward greater emphasis
on business skills and the measurement of individual productivity is but one
indication of how professional service firms in general, and law firms in
particular, have lost a considerable degree of control over the ways in which
they organize and provide services. Firms are now more directly subject to
market forces that shape their operations and determine their fate. As such,
they are more likely to be regarded simply as “service providers” rather
than as institutions that embody distinctive values of professionalism.163
In structural terms, this is reflected in a movement from classical part-
nerships to more complex organizational forms. The classical partnership is
an organization that embodies a way of organizing and delivering services
that reflects a logic of professionalism that differs both from an unregulated
market and a bureaucratic organization. In an unregulated market, “consum-
ers are fully informed about the quality and cost of available goods and
services and choose them rationally, to their own best interest.”164 The re-
sult is that “consumer preference and choice determine[ ] whose services
will succeed,” and “[v]alue is measured primarily by cost.”165  In a world
governed by bureaucracy, “the production and distribution of goods and
services are planned and controlled by the administration of large organiza-
tions.”166 In this system, “the executive officers or managers of organiza-
163. See generally Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Im-
pact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers”, A.B.A. J. PROF. LAW., Aug. 17,
2012.
164. FRIEDSON, supra note 21, at 1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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tions control those who produce goods and services, aiming primarily at
predictability and efficiency.”167
To use Eliot Friedson’s terms, “professionalism” offers a “third logic”
of production.  It represents:
A world in which those workers who have the specialized knowl-
edge that allows them to provide especially important services
have the power to organize and control their own work. Legally,
only they can offer their particular services to consumers or hold
jobs performing them in organizations: neither consumers nor
managers are free to employ anyone else. Furthermore, only
members of the occupation have the right to supervise and correct
the work of colleagues. They do not abuse those exclusive rights,
however, because they are more dedicated to doing good work for
their own satisfaction and for the benefit of others than to maxi-
mizing their income.168
Neither market, bureaucracy, nor professionalism exists in pure form;
the three logics represent ideal types that can provide insight into our think-
ing about different ways of organizing the production of goods and ser-
vices. For several decades in the twentieth century, many large law firms
operated under competitive conditions that enabled considerable reliance on
the logic of professionalism. Firms enjoyed considerable autonomy over
how their operations were organized:
How cases were staffed and billed, how partners were selected
and paid, and how new partners were admitted to the ranks were
issues based on internal considerations rather than market factors.
Free to conduct their affairs as they wished, the established prac-
tices could all but ignore such boorish concerns as efficiency, pro-
ductivity, marketing and competition.169
Law firms during this period operated as examples of “the classical
professional organization where power rests in the hands of professional
experts, managers administer the facilities and support the professionals,
decisions are made collegially, change is slow, and strategy is formulated
consensually.”170 In the classical partnership, professional partners own,
govern, and manage the firm, and provide professional services to clients.
They exercise considerable discretion in applying expertise to complex
problems and tend to work independently with minimal oversight and
coordination.171
In recent decades, however:
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1–2.
169. MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY 8–9 (1987).
170. David M. Brock, The Changing Professional Organization: A Review of Competing Ar-
chetypes, INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 157, 160 (2006).
171. See David J. Cooper et al., Sedimentation and Transformation in Organizational Change:
The Case of Canadian Law Firms, 17 ORG. STUDIES 623, 626 (1996).
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Markets for professional services have been deregulated, competi-
tion is increasing both within and between professions, clients are
increasingly sophisticated and demanding, and innovative tech-
nologies open opportunities for service delivery and encourage
the entry of new providers.172
These developments have placed pressures on the ability of profes-
sional service firms to maintain the control over production that they en-
joyed in earlier years.173 As we discuss in more detail below, this set of
forces has prompted movement away from the classical partnership model.
It has “encouraged rationalization and [has] led to the adoption of more
efficient structures. It has also encouraged a greater focus on business de-
velopment and the marketing of professional services.”174 Professional or-
ganizations now tend to be more internally differentiated, “with a core staff
of professional managers, and the traditional system of partnership govern-
ance giving way to a more corporate model.”175 In addition, “[t]he language
of business—customers, market share, mergers, efficiency and profit—is
increasingly the norm in contemporary professional organizations.”176 In
these ways, the organization of professional services acquires more features
of both the market and the bureaucratic forms of production.
The concept of organizational archetypes provides insight into the dy-
namics of this process. This concept has been used to analyze the evolution
of professional organizations such as accounting firms,177 architectural
firms,178 hospitals,179 and law firms.180 Greenwood and Hinings define an
archetype as comprised of two conceptual elements. First, it focuses on
overall patterns of organizational structures and management systems that
characterize an institution or set of institutions, rather than on narrow orga-
nizational properties. Second, it treats those patterns as “a function of the
ideas, beliefs and values—the components of an ‘interpretive scheme’—
that underpin and are embodied in organizational structures and sys-
172. Brock, supra note 170, at 157.
173. For discussion of these developments in law firms, see REGAN, supra note 28; GALANTER
& HENDERSON, supra note 32.
174. Brock, supra note 170, at 161.
175. Id. at 163–64.
176. Id. at 164.
177. See DAVID M. BROCK ET AL., RESTRUCTURING THE PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION: AC-
COUNTING, HEALTH CARE & LAW 131 (1999).
178. See Ashly Pinnington & Timothy Morris, Transforming the Architect: Ownership Form
and Archetype Change, 23 ORG. STUDIES 189 (2002).
179. See BROCK ET AL., supra note 177, at 183.
180. See Cooper et al., supra note 171; see also Ashly Pinnington & Timothy Morris, Arche-
type Change in Professional Organizations: Survey Evidence from Large Law Firms, 14 BRITISH
J. MGMT. 85 (2003).
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tems.”181 An archetype is therefore “a set of structures and systems that
reflects a single interpretive scheme.”182
One example is Greenwood and his colleagues’ archetype of the pro-
fessional partnership, or “P2” form of organization.183 This archetype is the
institutional expression of the logic of professionalism, and the basis for
what David Brock calls the “classical professional organization.”184 In the
P2 organization, “[a] partner is an owner of a firm, is involved in its overall
management, and is a key production worker.”185 Work requires the exer-
cise of professional judgment that is “not amenable to close bureaucratic
control.”186 Control therefore “has to be exercised not through standardiza-
tion of routines but through standardization of skills.”187 Professionals in
the P2 organization will resist the use of detailed cost accounting and finan-
cial targets to manage behavior.188 As a result, “systems of performance
appraisal will be tolerant, because without specific targets tight accountabil-
ity is impossible.”189 Furthermore, “professional organizations have a
strong service ethic and a strong concept of community involvement and
responsibility. Partnership implies a career commitment, which is inconsis-
tent with financial myopia and tight accountability.”190
These structural features of the P2 form embody an interpretive
scheme that reflects a distinctive understanding of what it means to be a
professional. Features such as participation by the full partnership in gov-
ernance decisions and the provision of services by professionals exercising
relatively unfettered discretion express a notion of professionalism that em-
phasizes the independence of the individual lawyer. The use of collegial
structures as the basis of organization is designed “to respect professionals’
desire for autonomy, to maintain the principle of partnership, and to pro-
mote acceptance and cooperation.”191 Similarly, basing compensation on
seniority rather than assessments of individual productivity embodies the
notion that the true professional is motivated by the desire to do excellent
work in cooperation with colleagues, not the desire to maximize financial
gain.192
181. Royston Greenwood & C.R. Hinings, Understanding Strategic Change: The Contribu-
tion of Archetypes, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1052, 1052 (1993).
182. Id.
183. Royston Greenwood et al., “P2-Form” Strategic Management: Corporate Practices in
Professional Partnerships, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 725 (1990).
184. Brock, supra note 170, at 160.
185. Greenwood et al., supra note 183, at 730.
186. Id. at 732.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 735.
189. Id. at 736.
190. Id.
191. Greenwood et al., supra note 183, at 750.
192. Greenwood and his colleagues do not discuss this subject, but this form of compensation
is an important feature of the traditional professional partnership.
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In periods of relative stability, organizational features and interpretive
schemes are generally aligned and reinforce one another. Hence, we can
clearly identify a prevailing archetype such as the professional partnership.
As organizations encounter significant new challenges, however, structural
features and interpretive schemes may drift apart. Challenges may call for
the introduction of new features that seem more adaptive to the environ-
ment in which firms must operate. These new features cannot be adopted in
a professional organization, however, without justifying them in accordance
with a plausible interpretive scheme.
This scheme may require clarification of how a structural innovation
better enables an organization to realize traditional professional values
under new competitive conditions. Alternatively, it may require making the
case that some traditional values are no longer functional or have become
unrealistic in light of changes in the environment. The latter argument pro-
vides the basis for claiming that an innovation embodies a productive refor-
mulation of professional values more in line with current realities. As new
features and interpretive schemes emerge and become aligned, new arche-
types of professional service firms arise. As new archetypes arise, so do
revised notions of professionalism.
One approach to archetypes that seems especially relevant to our focus
on competing criteria for allocating professional respect is the concept of
“sedimentation.”193 This concept reflects the view that competing arche-
types can simultaneously co-exist within law and other professional service
firms. The point of departure for this observation is the claim that profes-
sional service firms in fields such as accounting, medicine, and law are
moving away from the professional partnership (P2) in response to increas-
ing competitive pressures. While scholars differ about the archetype that
may be emerging in response to these developments, one prominent view is
that firms are moving toward the managed professional business (MPB).194
Scholars positing this development maintain that the underlying orientation
of the MPB is “to see the organization as a business.”195
With respect to law firms, the P2 archetype acknowledges that the firm
is a business, but its interpretive scheme “stresses that it is a special kind of
business” in which professionals apply their specialized expertise on behalf
of clients who are “relatively ignorant about their needs.”196 This imbalance
in sophistication imposes a constraint on the firm’s pursuit of financial
objectives.
193. See David J. Cooper et al., supra note 171, at 635.
194. Id. at 624–25.  David Brock suggests that emerging alternatives to the P2 form are the
global professional network and a “Star” form that represents a small to medium size specialized
firm that focuses on “the highest professional quality standards and a commitment to individual
excellence.” BROCK ET AL., supra note 177, at 168–69.
195. Cooper et al., supra note 171, at 630.
196. Id.
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By contrast, the MPB model “shifts the view of the client to someone,
often corporate counsel, who wants demonstrable value for money, and
takes legal expertise for granted.”197 From this perspective, “technical skill
is taken for granted and seen as insufficient to provide a value-added ser-
vice to the client.”198 The interpretive scheme of the MPB reflects a shift in
the meaning of both the terms “professional” and “partner.”
The attributes which sociologists of the professions used to iden-
tify as the hallmarks of a professional, such as education, voca-
tion, esoteric knowledge, self regulation, and civility, have been
replaced, or at least augmented, by an interpretation that stresses
punctuality, style, dynamism, financial success and entrepreneuri-
alism.  The meaning of the term ‘partner’ has also changed [away
from an emphasis on autonomy].  In the MPB, a partner is a team
player, one who trusts the leadership and works for the common
good, for example by transferring work to the person in the firm
who is most competent or short of work.199
In the MPB, each professional is seen as a profit center, and the firm
adopts more formal management systems and policies in an effort to stand-
ardize behavior. Compensation is set by a central authority, and “is based
on a person’s perceived contribution to the firm.”200 The firm develops
more elaborate and detailed criteria for evaluating contribution “so that bus-
iness development, marketing, management or pro-bono work can be for-
mally recognized, although the usual complaint . . . is that billable hours,
total revenue or financial contribution dominates the assessment of
contribution.”201
The MPB thus attempts to achieve greater structural integration of
lawyers who traditionally exercised considerable discretion over how they
spent their time and did their work. It is likely, however, that most law
firms will feature less centralized control over their operations than in other
professional service firms because of the need to secure the ongoing com-
mitment of rainmakers. Clients emphasize that they hire lawyers, not law
firms. They now commonly assemble project teams comprised of lawyers
from different firms who each provide different specialized expertise. In
addition, unlike other professional service firms, law firms generally cannot
enforce any limits on their lawyers’ ability to leave and compete with them
by taking clients to another firm.202 Firms are therefore continuously vul-
nerable to the critical loss of their most valuable assets. The result, as Rob-
ert Nelson has put it, is that “[m]anagerial authority in the law firm can
197. Id. at 630–31.
198. Id. at 631.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 633.
201. Cooper et al., supra note 171, at 633.
202. See Regan, Jr., supra note 87, at 3.
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never achieve autonomy from those partners with client responsibility.”203
Firm governance requires that management consult with rainmakers on ma-
jor issues and that it achieve some degree of consensus among them in
order to adopt any significant changes in policy.
This dependence on rainmakers means that many of the managerial
initiatives that firms adopt will be designed to provide greater support for
partners’ efforts to obtain work from and develop relationships with clients.
Pinnington and Morris, for instance, found that the law firms in their study
devoted significant resources to achieving changes described as “[m]ore fo-
cused on meeting client needs,” “[f]inancial controls to monitor perform-
ance,” “[m]ore professional marketing methods,” “[m]ore coordinated
approach to winning clients,” “[l]inked decisions about hiring and promot-
ing more closely to the needs of the business,” and “[q]uality control poli-
cies.”204 By contrast, they found more limited attempts to adopt centralized
managerial approaches that displaced the need for consultation with part-
ners on matters of business strategy.205 As they put it, “[e]xtensive consul-
tation with partners over a range of strategic issues balances the power of a
managerial group concerned to establish formalized modes of ‘rational’
planning.”206
These findings lead Pinnington and Morris to question whether law
firms are moving toward the MPB archetype. They suggest instead that
firms are adopting managerial approaches that serve to reinforce the form of
governance that characterizes the P2 archetype.
The underlying values of partnership are not erased by the MPB
characteristics evident in the survey because the role of partners
as the core producers, decision-makers and owners has not been
altered. Our results suggest that law firms have adopted some cor-
porate management practices, but not changed fundamentally
from the P2 archetype.207
While Pinnington and Morris underscore an important way in which
law firms differ from other professional service firms, trends nonetheless
suggest that many law firms now differ in significant ways from the P2
archetype.208 In the P2 form, all partners enjoy considerable discretion and
freedom from close management oversight. In recent years, however, law
203. ROBERT NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE
FIRM 5 (1988).
204. Pinnington & Morris, supra note 180, at 94.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 95.
207. Id.
208. “[L]aw firms have responded to . . . challenge[s] to their autonomy by desperately trying
to shed their traditional distinctiveness from business. The prevailing wisdom is that only “busi-
ness-like” firms that successfully organize themselves in ways that parallel their business clients
will survive in today’s competitive marketplace.”  David B. Wilkins, Partner Schmartner! EEOC
v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1273 (2007).
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firms have subjected an increasing percentage of partners to monitoring and
direction by the firm. In addition, a larger portion of partners now have only
minimal involvement and voice in firm governance. Only rainmakers tend
to have the kind of freedom that all partners enjoyed in the P2 organization.
It is their agreement, rather than that of the partnership as a whole, that is
critical in determining strategy and firm policy. As Brock observes:
[F]or those remaining in professional partnerships, increased size,
consequent dilution in partnership shares and the introduction of
different levels of partnership effectively change the meaning of
partnership for most partners—they actually are little different
from middle managers in terms of their status, power, and
remuneration.209
For these reasons, it seems more convincing to regard changes in the
management and governance of law firms over the last few decades as con-
sistent with the emergence of an MPB archetype. Perhaps it is most accu-
rate to say that law firms may be moving toward a particular variant of the
MPB. That variant combines more centralized administrative functions with
core operations that rely crucially on the entrepreneurial efforts of key
partners.
Cooper and his colleagues argue that the shift to a new archetype does
not simply reflect the incremental incorporation of more rational managerial
techniques as the P2 firm moves along a continuum.  Rather, “this move-
ment represents a shift from one set of values and practices to another.”
They elaborate:
The introduction of marketing into a professional service firm
does not mean ‘just’ adding a function; to represent a move to the
MPB, it has to be undergirded with a different way of conceptual-
izing the relationship of the firm to its clients and to its environ-
ment generally.  Similarly, the introduction of a partner in charge
of other partners is only a crucial break with the value of equity in
governance when it is linked to a change in the interpretive
scheme such that the role is one of control and strategy, rather
than being seen as a coordinator between equals.210
The MPB thus represents an interpretive scheme that is distinct from
the scheme embodied in the P2 firm. Cooper and his colleagues take pains,
however, to emphasize that the emergence of the MPB scheme does not
represent simply the replacement of one archetype by another. The process
rather is one of “sedimentation,” in which competing archetypes such as the
MPB and the P2 co-exist to varying degrees.211 New archetypes gradually
emerge that challenge but may not completely displace older ones, “with
the different interpretive schemes influencing and modifying each other, yet
209. BROCK ET AL., supra note 177, at 165.
210. Cooper et al., supra note 171, at 634.
211. Id. at 635.
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also resulting in contradictions in the systems and structures.”212 The mean-
ing of any given organizational feature will vary based on the interpretive
scheme that is used to make sense of it. “[N]ot only do different lawyers
articulate different schemes, but . . . the two schemes are drawn upon by the
same lawyer to explain and justify contradictory practices in different parts
of the firm’s activities.”213
Thus, for instance, one law firm that Cooper and his colleagues studied
was committed to ensuring that its lawyers led balanced lives that provided
enough time for involvement in family and community activities outside the
office. The firm therefore hired a non-lawyer chief executive to enable law-
yers to concentrate on legal practice without the need to engage in market-
ing, collection, strategy, and other business activities. From this
perspective, creation of the CEO position could be explained and justified
within the interpretive scheme of the professional partnership. For some
partners, however, employing a CEO was consistent with an MPB interpre-
tive scheme. This is reflected in one partner’s comment that “[t]he CEO is
there to force partners to get their practice into shape,” and another is that
the job of the CEO is “to step on toes, to hammer the partners.”214 These
competing interpretive schemes existed simultaneously within the firm.
Each could serve as the justification for the CEO to assume some responsi-
bilities but not others, and each could be used to evoke different values that
did not necessarily have to be definitively reconciled.
The process of determining compensation can be seen as an occasion
for the invocation of interpretive schemes associated with different law firm
archetypes. A firm’s exposure to new competitive conditions may call into
question traditional criteria for determining compensation. Management
may believe that changes are necessary to respond to these conditions, but
successfully introducing changes requires justifying them in terms that reso-
nate with an interpretive scheme that partners can accept. That scheme will
need to provide a persuasive account of how a new compensation system
will strike a balance between business necessities and professional values
that enables the firm to respond effectively to the challenges that it faces.
An interpretive scheme, in other words, must offer an understanding of
what it means to be a good lawyer that partners can accept. Furthermore,
maintaining the allegiance of partners requires not just that they agree with
management’s proposed revisions to the compensation system. It also re-
quires their continuing acceptance of decisions with respect to their own
compensation and what such decisions express about their place in the firm.
As one set of scholars maintains, archetypes need to be understood as “part
of an historical process by which firms and the people who work in them
212. Id. at 636.
213. Id. at 638.
214. Id.
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not only accumulate wealth, but also obtain their identity.”215 This perspec-
tive underscores that compensation is part of both a material and a moral
economy within the firm.
Archetype theory suggests that two interpretive schemes currently are
available for making sense of compensation in law firms. The scheme that
is an element of the P2 archetype emphasizes certain traditional profes-
sional attributes that contribute in various ways to the firm’s success, but
whose impact is not amenable to precise measurement. These include a
commitment to doing high-quality work; willingness to help colleagues
when the need arises; bringing in colleagues whose expertise can increase
the value of service to clients, rather than hoarding client work for oneself;
spending time providing guidance to junior lawyers; taking on firm citizen-
ship responsibilities; involvement in pro bono and community activities;
and a general spirit of collegiality and cooperation.
These skills and activities can enhance a firm’s financial performance.
Many of them help ensure that clients are satisfied with the firm’s services,
while others can strengthen the firm’s reputation in the market for both
clients and lawyers. The P2 archetype, however, also regards these qualities
as sources of intrinsic satisfaction that make membership in a professional
partnership a rewarding experience beyond the financial benefits that it pro-
vides. In this respect, they contribute to a broad conception of what it means
to be a successful lawyer and a successful law firm. Calls for placing more
weight on these types of contributions thus reflect invocation of a P2 inter-
pretive scheme that conceptualizes the firm as a distinctive professional or-
ganization. This scheme furnishes specific criteria for determining who
deserves respect.
The MPB archetype tends to emphasize a notion of contribution that
focuses more on business skills, and to rely on more precise calculations of
individual productivity. This reflects a movement toward closer managerial
oversight of the firm’s business performance and the imposition of greater
accountability for meeting financial targets. Management uses a highly dif-
ferentiated compensation system as an instrument in the service of these
objectives. Because firms operate in a competitive market in which they
cannot count on repeat business from clients, they give substantial weight in
the compensation process to the ability of a partner to develop relationships
with loyal clients. In these ways, law firms are moving toward compensa-
tion systems that reflect the interpretive scheme of the MPB. This scheme
provides distinctive criteria for determining what it means to be a good
lawyer under current conditions of law firm practice.
Our research suggests that both archetypes have resonance with re-
spect to law firm compensation. This is consistent with the notion that the
MPB is layered on top of the P2 in the process of sedimentation. As Cooper
215. Id. at 643.
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and his colleagues suggest, “[s]edimentation points to the persistence of
values, ideas and practices, even when the formal structures and processes
seem to change, and even when there may be incoherence.”216 The inter-
views we have described make clear that a shift in compensation is under-
way from one set of values to another. As one partner observes, “It used to
be when you made partner, when I made partner it was easier, right, it was
work hard, be a good lawyer and you’ll probably make partner. Now it’s
more of a business case.  Is this person going to be a business genera-
tor?”217 Law firm managers increasingly feel that they have no choice but
to emphasize these skills. To reiterate a quote from one partner, “[I]f you
don’t grow, you die, and you need to grow to stay competitive in compensa-
tion because no matter how great your culture is—we see plenty of firms
around with great cultures supposedly and people who love working there,
but the firm disintegrates and the economic forces can do that.”218 As a
result, one income partner says of his colleagues that they’re unlikely to be
promoted to equity partner “unless we have . . . access to a client who will
bring in at least a couple of million dollars a year.”219
At the same time, some partners express frustration that those who
contribute by doing excellent work can be slighted under this system. One
partner laments that lawyers “who expand the business of [rainmakers’] cli-
ents by doing work that the rainmaker or others could not necessarily do
. . . . However, that is not valued nearly as much as the rainmakers.”220
Another partner complains, “Someone brings the work in and I do 98 per-
cent of the work . . . and I feel like he’s getting . . . overly compensated and
I’m getting under-compensated.”221 Some lawyers also express broader
concerns about increasing emphasis on financial metrics. As one declares,
“[w]e join this profession, we went into law, at least I did, not to maximize
every dollar that you get, but because we like the intellectual rigor of what
we do . . . it has to be more meaningful than just trying to squeeze the
pennies out today. If you are good at doing what we do and work as hard as
we work, to make it palatable there have to be human relationships and
interactions.”222 Competing conceptions of values associated with P2 and
MPB models thus tend to co-exist in most firms despite structural changes
that have moved firms closer to an MPB paradigm.
While archetype theory acknowledges that competing archetypes may
coexist, it tends to regard such a condition as one of “incoherence,” which
creates “a tendency to organizational instability or reduced perform-
216. Cooper et al., supra note 171, at 624.
217. Interview 111, supra note 11, at 6.
218. Interview 52, supra note 14, at 14.
219. Interview 101, supra note 39, at 6.
220. Interview 72, supra note 23, at 3.
221. Interview 98, supra note 1, at 5.
222. Interview 23, supra note 116, at 11.
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ance.”223 The assumption is that organizations over time tend to evolve to-
ward archetypal coherence, in which a single interpretive scheme
prevails.224
This may not be the case, however, at least with respect to law firms.
In light of the changes that firms have adopted in recent years, one might
think that management would push for the triumph of the MPB archetype
with respect to matters such as compensation. There is reason to believe,
however, that management will continue to find it important to acknowl-
edge the values expressed by the P2 archetype. While competitive condi-
tions may require giving more weight to business skills in the compensation
process, basing compensation only on these skills is short-sighted. Success-
fully attracting clients, for instance, is dependent on a firm’s reputation for
providing high-quality services. Furthermore, while business skills may
bring in work, such work must be done well and done efficiently for clients
to be satisfied and to turn to the firm for additional services. This requires
attributes valorized by the P2 archetype, such as a commitment to high stan-
dards of quality, a willingness to collaborate, subordination of self-interest
to the goal of providing the best service for clients, and taking the time to
mentor junior lawyers who can enhance the value of the work that the firm
performs. Many capabilities that have traditionally been regarded as the
hallmark of a good professional, in other words, can also further the firm’s
financial goals.
Apart from their commercial value, however, these capabilities are a
source of intrinsic professional satisfaction for many lawyers. A firm that
provides such satisfaction is more likely to generate loyalty on the part of
its partners. Such loyalty is a critical form of organizational glue in an era in
which even established, successful firms can disintegrate with astonishing
speed. Affording partners respect based on traditionally valued capabili-
ties—not simply business skills—can therefore be important to a firm’s
ability to withstand the centrifugal pressures of the modern legal services
market.
Many law firm dissolutions over the past several years confirm this
insight. As one former partner at Dewey & LeBouef remarked, firm man-
agement “understood that the firm was all about the money . . . . What they
could never understand is, if that’s all that holds a firm together, you have
nothing left when the money runs out.”225 Similarly, when the first mega-
firm Finley, Kumble collapsed in 1987, Steve Brill commented that the
firm’s demise “will redeem the idea that there’s more to law practice than
an aggressive business plan—that quality work, and real professionalism,
223. Id.
224. BROCK ET AL., supra note 177, at 170.
225. Julie Triedman, Sara Randazzo & Brian Baxter, House of Cards, AM. LAW., June 27,
2012, at pt. 1.
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and liking one’s partner aren’t sissy stuff after all, but are essential to build-
ing a truly solid, truly prosperous law business.”226
For these reasons, many firms may be likely to attempt to balance reli-
ance on both the MPB and the P2 archetypes in determining compensation.
The appeal to different archetypes in the compensation process can be seen
as the assertion of different “orders of worth” in the law firm. This concept
focuses on principles of evaluation that “[e]ach define[ ] the good, the just,
and the fair—but according to different criteria of judgment. Each qualifies
persons and objects with a distinctive grammar or logic.”227 In the law firm
setting, we can see the MPB and P2 archetypes as representing two orders
of worth that serve as the basis for evaluating and conferring respect upon
partners.
David Stark suggests that organizations can benefit from declining to
resolve contests over orders of worth by “enforcing a single principle of
evaluation as the only legitimate framework.”228 He argues that accepting
the legitimacy of multiple conceptions of what is valuable can foster crea-
tive tension in an organization that makes it more flexible and capable of
innovation. “If you are confident that you know precisely what resources
your organization will need in the indefinite future to meet stable and pre-
dictable markets,” he says, “then dissonance is an avoidable headache that
you need not abide.”229 But “[w]here the organizational environment is tur-
bulent and there is uncertainty about what might constitute a resource under
changed conditions, contending frameworks of value can themselves be a
valuable organizational resource.”230 Law firms attempting to reconcile in-
creasing business pressures with notions of professionalism thus may at-
tempt to “keep multiple principles of evaluation in play” as they attempt to
answer the questions, “What is valuable, and by what measures?”231
Archetype theory tends to focus on professional services as a whole or,
in some formulations, particular professions or sectors. We can also, how-
ever, focus on the individual practice organization as a site where profes-
sionals are attempting to forge a conception of professionalism that reflects
an appropriate response to the particular conditions under which the firm
operates. As Michael Kelly has argued, the practice organization:
Is the arena for working out the pressures of competition for cli-
ents, internal tensions over compensation, and delicate balances
between the costs and benefits of supervision and practice quality,
teaching and public service, collegial decision making and fo-
226. Steven Brill, Bye, Bye Finley, Kumble, AM. LAW., September 1994.
227. DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC LIFE 12
(2009).  Stark draws on LUC BOLTANSKI & LAURENT THEVENOT, ON JUSTIFICATION: ECONOMIES
OF WORTH (2006).
228. STARK, supra note 227, at 5.
229. Id. at 6.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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cused directions for the growth of the practice. The standard con-
ception of lawyer ideals does not include the most fundamental
trade-offs an organization makes between decisions about busi-
ness and decisions about professional identity. Professionalism is
not an abstraction in an organization. It is forged in every deci-
sion of the practice.232
Kelly’s argument suggests that different firms will manage the ten-
sions between the MPB and P2 archetypes in different ways. A firm’s com-
pensation process can provide one source of insight into how it is
attempting to do this. Firms’ perceived need in recent years to weigh busi-
ness skills more heavily because of competitive pressures means that com-
pensation decisions may present, in especially stark relief, contests over the
relative value of business skills and more traditional professional capabili-
ties. Such contests will serve in each firm to shape that firm’s culture, par-
ticularly with respect to the meaning of professionalism for the lawyers that
practice within it. The cumulative effect of these conversations and deci-
sions will shape the interpretive scheme that purports to tell lawyers how to
make sense of their role in an emerging, more commercial, archetype of the
modern law firm.
These suggestions about the relevance of archetype theory to our re-
search are meant to be tentative. We did not approach our project with this
theory in mind and undoubtedly have not explored issues at this point that
would be relevant in assessing its applicability to our findings. We do be-
lieve, however, that archetype theory appears to shed light on important
aspects of law firm compensation, and that rigorous work on compensation
that focuses more explicitly on this theory’s key concepts may be a promis-
ing area of research.
CONCLUSION
When lawyers talk about law firm culture and the elements that shape
it, partner compensation is a prominent topic of discussion. Compensation
can influence culture by distributing financial goods within a material econ-
omy in ways that provide incentives for certain types of behavior. The crite-
ria on which a firm relies to distribute those financial goods also shapes
culture by communicating a firm’s conception of professionalism: what at-
tributes and qualities are important in determining what it means to be a
good lawyer. In this respect, compensation is part of a moral economy that
allocates respect and professional meaning among its partners. The material
and moral economies serve to express a firm’s understanding of its purpose
and function, which provides a way for its members to orient themselves
according to a set of values and prescriptions for behavior.
232. MICHAEL KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS 13 (1994).
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As firms become subject to increasing competitive business pressures,
they have tended to use their compensation systems as more deliberate in-
struments of business strategy to encourage behavior that furthers the firm’s
financial performance. Because most firms are dependent on the efforts of
partners who have relationships with key clients, compensation systems in-
creasingly provide substantial rewards for developing such relationships. In
addition, firms have created systems that differentiate more finely how vari-
ous types of partner activities contribute to revenues. These developments
reflect the view that today’s successful law firm partner must possess profit-
able business skills, not simply traditional legal talents. More generally,
they signal that today’s successful law firm must be run more explicitly as a
business enterprise, not simply as an organization of lawyers guided by val-
ues internal to the legal profession.
Our research suggests that the compensation process provides an occa-
sion for contesting the relative weight that a firm gives to modern business
skills and traditional professional capabilities. A firm’s decisions on this
issue serve to allocate respect among its partners because it expresses a
hierarchy of attributes that serves as the basis for assessing who are valua-
ble members of the firm. This hierarchy reflects a firm’s working concep-
tion of what constitutes professionalism in a world in which law firm
practice is subject to fierce market forces.
As Cooper and his colleagues observe, “There is no unique and un-
changing meaning to ideas such as professionalism or partnership.”233 It is
possible for professionalism in the law firm setting to be assimilated to
business logic, by conceptualizing firms as one particular type of business
organization that is distinctive only in the type of service that it provides. It
is also possible, although perhaps more difficult, to fashion a notion of pro-
fessionalism that acknowledges business realities but also incorporates a
conception of lawyers as distinctive because of their adherence to certain
traditional values internal to the profession. Our research suggests that the
partner compensation process is one arena in which modern law firms are
attempting to work through a response to this challenge. As such, it repre-
sents yet another chapter in the ongoing process of determining what it
means to be a lawyer.
233. Cooper et al., supra note 171, at 634.
